University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

2003

Facing Tyranny with Justice: Alternatives to War in
the Confrontation with Iraq
George Bisharat
UC Hastings College of the Law, bisharat@uchastings.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
George Bisharat, Facing Tyranny with Justice: Alternatives to War in the Confrontation with Iraq, 7 Journal of Gender 1 (2003).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/42

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

Faculty Publications
UC Hastings College of the Law Library
Bisharat

George

Author:

George Bisharat

Source:

Journal of Gender, Race & Justice

Citation:

7 J. Gender Race & Just. 1 (2003).

Title:

Facing Tyranny with Justice: Alternatives to War in the Confrontation with Iraq

Originally published in JOURNAL OF GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE. This article is reprinted with
permission from JOURNAL OF GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE and Iowa College of Law, Iowa City.

Facing Tyranny with Justice: Alternatives to

War in the Confrontation with Iraq
George E.Bisharat*

I. INTRODUCTION

Unbeknownst to most residents of the U.S., our government has waged a
quiet, illegal, and relentless war against Iraq for the past twelve years.1 If we
have invaded Iraq by the time this article is published, it will not be because we
have lacked policy alternatives. Although Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is a
brutal and dangerous man and the regional challenge constituted by his regime
is not wholly illusory, none of the disasters caused by our actions have been

Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law. This article is, in a sense, a sequel to the
author's earlier Sanctions as Genocide, II TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 379 (2001). That
article argued that there is a primafacie case that comprehensive multilateral sanctions against Iraq
originally imposed during the conflict in the Gulf in 1990-1991 have come to constitute a violation
of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In that writing,
the author declined to discuss possible alternatives to the sanctions policy, as to do so might have
legitimized the view that the sanctions, though problematic, were nonetheless justifiable unless
better alternatives were presented. The author's position is that genocide (if indeed the sanctions
may be so construed), is never justifiable, irrespective of possible alternatives. The current article
fleshes out another claim made, but not elaborated, in the first article, namely, that alternatives to
the sanctions policy - and now, to war - do indeed exist. The author thanks Kevin Sul and the other
editors of the JOURNAL OF GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE for the invitation to participate in the
symposium leading to this publication. Professor Enrique Carrasco of the University of Iowa Law
School made particularly insightful comments on the author's symposium presentation, for which
the author is also extremely grateful. Discussions of some of the ideas presented here with the
author's Hastings colleagues Joel Paul and Keith Wingate were also much appreciated.
1. A preponderantly U.S. readership is assumed, and so the liberty of an "our" or "we"referring to citizens/residents of the U.S.-is occasionally taken. No slight to others is intended; it is
in the U.S. that knowledge and understanding of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship is most urgently needed.
It is here, as well, that the fog of disinformation has been thickest. At no point was this more
egregious than during the 1991 Gulf War, when the U.S. government actively manipulated public
perceptions of the fighting, with the complicity of a thoroughly compliant press. See generall.
JOHN R. MACARTHUR, SECOND FRONT (1992) (providing a highly informative account). This is not
to suggest, however, that these features of U.S. policy are unique to its relationship with Iraq. For a
discussion of U.S. interventions in many other countries across the globe, see WILLIAM BLUM,
KILLING HOPE: U.S. MILITARY AND CIA INTERVENTIONS SINCE WORLD WAR 11(1995). Neither is
the complicity of the press in misleading the public as to the objectives of U.S. foreign policy. See
DAVID MACGOWAN, DERAILING DEMOCRACY (2000). The disinformation campaign is once again
approaching a crescendo. See generally NORMAN SOLOMON AND REESE ERLICH, TARGET IRAQ:
WHAT THE NEWS MEDIA DIDN'T TELL You (2003).
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inevitable or necessary. 2 On the contrary, we have always had policy
alternatives with respect to Iraq that would have been just, humane, and
consistent with international law. Moreover, these policy alternatives would
have better advanced any legitimate U.S. foreign policy goals. In contrast, an
invasion of Iraq may bring devastating consequences for the people of that
country, for the people of the U.S., and for the status of international law and
international institutions. Thus, the three aims of this article are to explore the
record of U.S. illegal actions toward Iraq, critique the current legal and political
stance the U.S. government has taken with respect to an invasion of Iraq, and
identify positive alternatives to war that might guide our present and future
dealings with that country.
The second section of this article will review the main components of U.S.
policy toward Iraq over the last three decades, pointing out, where appropriate,
respects in which our behavior has violated international law.3 The third section
examines the American position regarding war against Iraq and considers the
dangers and possible outcomes from such a conflict. The article then lays out a
a sequence of policy alternatives that address the real challenges posed by the
Iraqi regime. These alternatives uphold, rather than undermine, international
law. Finally, the article concludes with thoughts about possible future directions
of U.S. Middle East policy, based on justice, democracy, and respect for
international law.
11. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ: OIL AND INTERVENTION

The tale of U.S. involvement with Iraq is either mostly forgotten or never
learned in this country. We must excavate the history of U.S.-Iraqi relations in
some detail for four reasons. First, excavation serves to highlight the extent to
which the dangerous impasse we now face in our relationship with Iraq is one
of our own making. Second, it reveals the many fallacies and distortions that
2. "Insulting the [Iraqi] President is a capital offense. Reports of widespread extrajudicial
killings, torture whose cruelty defies the imagination, prolonged detentions without trial or charge,
mass 'disappearances,' persecution of the Shi'a of the south and genocidal acts against the Kurdish
minority have been abundantly documented." Karima Bennoune, Sovereignty vs. Suffering? Reexamining Sovereignv and Human Rights through the Lens of Iraq, 13 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 243, 249
(2002).
3. Fully elaborated legal arguments as to each of the many arguable violations of
international law committed by the United States in its relations with Iraq are beyond the scope of
this article. Partial elaboration, illustrative examples, and citations to sources with greater detail
should suffice to establish a platform for discussing current policies and their alternatives. There is
broad consensus, but not unanimity, among commentators regarding many of the legal positions
taken here (for example, regarding the legality of U.S.-British "no fly zones" in Iraq, discussed in
Section I1. G) and lesser agreement as to others; for example, whether UN-sponsored sanctions
against Iraq have come to constitute genocide, discussed in Section 1I.F. The author will attempt to
indicate where the weight of opinion lies and provide cites to contrary views. Also, the article does
not deal with possible U.S. constitutional violations in either past or contemporary dealings with
Iraq. See Richard Falk, The Rush to War, THE NATION, Aug. 19, 2002, at 5.

HeinOnline -- 7 J. Gender Race & Just. 2 2003

Facing Tyranny with Justice
underlie the justifications that are currently being offered for a U.S. invasion of
Iraq. Third, it aids in a more factual and level-headed reading of the real
challenges constituted by the regime of Saddam Hussein, and thus positions us
to better define effective policy alternatives for the future. So that no reader is
mistaken: restoring a more realistic assessment of the character of the Hussein
regime is in no sense an apology for its horrific crimes. 4 Finally, a historical
review of U.S. dealings with Iraq may instill a salutary measure of humility as
we contemplate our future relations with that country, and the wider Middle
East.
A. The Imperative of Oil
U.S. policy toward Iraq, and toward the Gulf region more generally, has
been shaped by the goal of defending Western access to the region's oil, which
constitutes well over 60% of the world's known reserves, 5 against either internal
or external threat. 6 Iraq itself possesses proven oil reserves of over 112 billion
barrels, second only to Saudi Arabia. 7 Moreover, this figure may represent less
than half of Iraq's production potential, since many fields have yet to be
explored. 8 Iraq also has natural gas reserves estimated at 110 trillion cubic feet. 9
In 1945, State Department officials referred to the Middle East as "a stupendous
source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world
history."' 10 To recognize the centrality of oil in U.S. Middle East policy is not,
however, to claim that oil explains every nuance or shift in that policy. It does
not-a fact to which we will return below when we examine the current push for
war with Iraq.

4. It seems entirely appropriate that much of the present Iraqi leadership, including Saddam
Hussein himself, should ultimately face an international criminal tribunal for war crimes and other
crimes against humanity. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
5.

Eric Davis, The Persian Gulf War: Myths and Realities, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE

MIDDLE EAST 275 (Hooshang Amirahmadi ed., 1993).

6. According to Mark Phythian, "The West has traditionally feared losing its influence over
and access to oil, either as a result of foreign (in classic cold war terms, Soviet) intervention, or
internal revolution. Therefore, the three most important issues in oil politics have been access,
reliability of flow, and stability of price." MARK PHYTHIAN, ARMING IRAQ: HOW THE U.S. AND
BRITAIN SECRETLY BUILT SADDAM'S WAR MACHINE 5 (1997).

7. James A. Paul, Iraq: The Struggle for Oil, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/oil/
2002/08jim.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2003). Iraqi oil is pure and relatively easy to extract, costing as
little as ninety-seven cents per barrel, as compared to, for example, to three to four dollars for North
Sea oil. Tom Cholmondeley, Over a Barrel, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 22, 2002, at P23.
8.

Id. at P23.

9. Jeremy Scahill, Oil is our Damnation, at http://www.progressive.org/dec02/scal202.html
(last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
10.

STEPHEN ZUNES, TINDERBOX 2 (2003).
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By the close of the Vietnam war era, a strong American aversion to direct
military intervention in distant parts of the globe had developed. Hence, U.S.
interests in the Gulf were advanced via support of the local "twin pillars," Iran
and Saudi Arabia, both staunchly anti-communist monarchies. I I While Saudi
Arabia wielded diplomatic and economic clout, Iran was the military juggernaut
under the Shah, armed with the most advanced U.S. weaponry. Together, they
a stability favorable to their own, and American,
were charged with maintaining
12
Gulf.
the
in
interests
Meanwhile, since 1976 U.S. policy with respect to the broader Middle East
has also rested on maintaining Israeli military superiority over the Arab
world. 13 Israel's primary role in U.S. strategy for the region has been to quell
the upsurge of radical Arab nationalism, which has persistently been a more
concrete challenge in the region for the U.S. than the prospect of direct Soviet
intervention. 14 While the U.S. has cultivated alliances with a variety of Arab
and non-Arab countries, Israel "stands at the apex of U.S. alliance structure in
the Middle East."

15

Among other things, an American-supervised stability in

region
the Middle East-or more bluntly, hegemony-has also ensured that the
16
remained a welcoming market for American commodities and services.

11. The strategy of relying first on local forces to repel aggression and only secondarily on
U.S. military power was a key feature of the Nixon Doctrine, announced in 1969. Elizabeth
Gamlen, United States Strategic Policy toward the Middle East: Central Command and the
Reflagging of Kuwait's Tankers, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST 215-16 (Hooshang
Amirahmadi ed., 1993).
12.

SANDRA MACKEY, THE RECKONING 338-39 (2002).

13.

In the words of political scientist Stephen Zunes:

If it were concerned simply with Israel's security, the United States would be
dedicated to maintaining Israeli defenses to the point where they would be
approximately equal to any realistic combination of Arab armed forces. Instead,
leaders of both American political parties have called for the United States to help
maintain not a military balance between Israel and its neighbors, but qualitative Israeli
military superiority. When Israel was less dominant militarily, there was no such
consensus for U.S. backing of Israel. The continued high levels of U.S. aid to Israel
[post-1967] does not likely come out of concern for Israel's survival. One explanation
may come from a desire for Israel to continue its strategic political dominance over
the Palestinians and the region as a whole.
Stephen Zunes, The Strategic Functions of U.S. Aid to Israel, 4 Middle East Policy (1996), at
http://www.stanford.edu/-bgiddens/zunes.htm (last visited Jan.16, 2003). See also Davis, supra
note 5, at 274. U.S. aid to Israel since 1973 has been estimated at $240 billion in 2001 dollars.
David Francis, Economist Tallies Swelling Cost of Israel to United States, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Dec. 9, 2002, at http://csmonitor.com/2002/1209/pl6sOl-wmgn.html (last visited Jan.
16, 2003).
14. See generally, NOAM CHOMSKY, THE FATEFUL TRIANGLE:
ISRAEL, AND THE PALESTINIANS (1983).
15.

THE UNITED STATES,

Davis, supra note 5, at 274.

16. One of the key ways in which the petrodollars of Middle Eastern nations have been
recycled to the United States and other Western nations has been through arms sales. U.S. arms
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U.S. relations with Iraq during the 1970's were cool, but not openly hostile.
Iraq had severed diplomatic relations with the U.S. following the 1967 ArabIsraeli war. In 1972, the ruling Ba'ath Party both nationalized the Iraq Petroleum
Company (IPC) 17 and signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. 18 Iraq
was also locked in periodic border disputes with U.S. client Iran over the Shatt
al-Arab waterway in the south, and with a Kurdish 19 uprising in the north,
which was sustained in part by aid funneled into Iran by both the U.S. and
Israel. 20 The two disputes were temporarily abated by the 1975 Algiers
Agreement, shepherded by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and
according to which outside aid to the Iraqi Kurds was stopped, and Iraq
accepted the median line of the Shatt al-Arab as the border between the two
countries. 2 1 The Kurdish rebels, abandoned22by their erstwhile "benefactors",
were quickly decimated by the Iraqi military.
B. Our "SOB"
The ascendance of Saddam Hussein to the presidency of Iraq in 1979
sales to the region since the Gulf War alone exceed $60 billion. Stephen Zunes, 10 Things to Know
about U.S. Policy in the Middle East, ALTERNET, Sept. 26, 2001, at http://www.alternet.org/story.
html?StorylD =11592 (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
17.

IPC is a consortium of British, French, and American interests established to exploit

Iraqi oil.

18. Michel Moushabek, Iraq: Years of Turbulence, in BEYOND THE STORM 31 (Phyllis
Bennis & Michel Moushabek eds., 1991).
19. The Kurds are a Turkic-language speaking ethnic group whose natal lands straddle
Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. In Iraq, they constitute approximately 20% of the population, and are
concentrated in the northern reaches of the country, including the mountains and plains adjacent to
the three other countries mentioned above. ANDREW & PATRICK COCKBURN, OUT OF THE ASHES:
THE RESURRECTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 59 (2000).
20. Id. at 33. In a practice repeated in U.S. support for Iraq during its war with Iran, the
quantity of aid doled out to the Kurds was carefully maintained at a level that made attainment of
their goal of autonomy impossible. A 1974 CIA memo reviewed by the House's Pike Commission
stated:
We would think that Iran would not look with favor on the establishment of a
formalized autonomous government. Iran, like ourselves, has seen benefit in a
stalemate situation ... in which Iraq is intrinsically weakened by the Kurds refusal to
relinquish semi-autonomy. Neither Iran nor ourselves wish to see the matter resolved
one way or the other.
BLUM, supra note 1, at 243. U.S. intervention in internal Iraqi affairs is taken up infra in Section
IIG.
21.

BLUM, supra note 1, at 243.

22. Gareth Smyth Beirut, The Middle East Mission Inpossible: In the Middle East. the CIA
Has Hurt Its Friends and Helped Its Own Enenies, TRENDS, at http://www.mafhoum.com/press2/
cia276_files/home files/azpolitics_03.htm(last visited Jan. 20, 2003). See also Husayn al-Kurdi,
The CIA in Kurdistan, ZNET MAGAZINE, Dec. 1996, at http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/
dec96kurdi.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
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coincided with a momentous shift in the regional constellation of power: the
victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran that Year. The U.S. was immediately
deprived of its most militarily capable "pillar" in the Gulf region. Moreover,
Iran made no secret of its aspirations to spread the Islamic revolution to other
countries of the region. Through much of the eighties, a major preoccupation of
U.S. policy-makers was containment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which
was
23
increasingly seen as the main threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East.
Notwithstanding Iraq's relationship with the Soviet Union and the Ba'ath
Party's affinity for a pallid version of socialism, 24 U.S. policy makers might
have had inklings that they would find Iraq to be a congenial replacement for
their fallen Iran "pillar." With the Algiers Agreement safely behind it, the
largely nationalist, secular, but Sunni Muslim-based Iraqi regime had turned its
attentions in the late seventies to consolidating its grip on power, brutally
suppressing both its communist rivals and Islamist groups based within the
majority Shi'a Muslim population of the South. 25 Even before Iraq launched its
attack against Iran in September 1980, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's
National Security Advisor, had stated publicly: "We see no fundamental
incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq ...
We do not
26
antagonisms."
in
frozen
be
to
need
relations
American-Iraqi
feel that
Equally important was the fact that Saddam Hussein himself was well
known to U.S. intelligence and policy makers from previous dealings in the
1960's.27 Hussein, who had joined the Ba'ath Party at the age of twenty-two,

23. BLUM, supra note I, at 64-72. Of course, the decidedly anti-American tone struck by
revolutionary Iran was a legacy of long U.S. support for the repressive government of the Shah,
dating back at least to 1953, when a CIA-instigated coup overthrew the legally elected government
of Prime Minister Mossadeq. Id.
24. The Arab "Ba'ath" ("Rennaissance") Party was founded in the 1940's by Syrians Michel
Aflaq (a Christian) and Salah al-Bitar (a Sunni Muslim) under the slogan "Unity [of the entire Arab
nation], Freedom [from colonial, primarily Western, domination], and Socialism." MACKEY, supra
note 12, at 186-87. The socialist element of Ba'ath ideology has translated primarily into an
enduring commitment to a social welfare state and the Ba'ath Party has been distinctly hostile
toward Iraqi communists. Davis, supra note 5, at 266.
25. Moushabek, supra note 18, at 32. Sunni Muslims are the orthodox and majority sect
within Islam; Shi'a Muslims are the heterodox sect that emerged from a seventh century schism.
CHARLES LINDHOLM, THE ISLAMIC MIDDLE EAST 167 (1996). While Shi'as are the minority within
the Muslim world as a whole, Shi'a Arabs constitute upwards of 50% of the population of Iraq,
chiefly occupying the southern districts of the state. Id. The Sunni minority, perhaps only 20% of
the population and concentrated in the triangle formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers, nonetheless has monopolized power over government and the military since the birth of the
modem state of Iraq. COCKBURN, supra note 19, at 58. Iraq is host to a Christian population of
about 800,000, some of whom are also ethnic minorities (Assyrians, Armenians) and to several
Muslim ethnic minorities (Kurds, Turkomans, and others). See Peter Baker, Christians in Iraq Fear
Backlash, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 26, 2002, at http://www.iht.com/articles/81387.htm (last
visited Mar. 13, 2003) (discussing the Christian community in Iraq).
26.

MACKEY, supra note 12, at 339.

27.

Geoff Simons, The Making of Iraq, 35 THE LINK 7 (2002) at http://www.ameu.org/
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had participated in a botched assassination and coup attempt against Iraqi
President Abd al-Karim Qassim in 1959. 28 Wounded, he fled to Egypt, where,
through Egyptian intelligence agents, he provided the Cairo CIA station with
names of Iraqi leftists. 29 In 1963, Qassim was overthrown in a CIA-backed
coup carried out by a smattering of Ba'athi activists. Hussein hurried back to
Iraq to assume responsibility over the internal Ba'ath intelligence apparatus.
Armed with lists compiled by the CIA stations throughout the Middle East,
Hussein, by some accounts, supervised the hunt for Iraqi communists and other
dissidents, and personally participated in their torture and executions. 3 1 The
Ba'ath Party staged a second coup in 1968, this time bloodless, that brought
Hassan al-Bakr to power after the Ba'ath had been briefly ousted from the ruling
clique. Saddam Hussein, vice president and deputy chair of the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC) 32 under al-Bakr, and the real power behind the
government, eventually packed al-Bakr off into retirement and declared himself
president of Iraq in 1979. 33 On August 8, under the pretense of foiling a Syrianbacked coup attempt, Hussein ordered the execution of twenty-one members of
the RCC, leaving the Ba'ath Party and state positions 34filled with loyalists, many
from his own clan originating in the village of Takrit.
Despite the severe and unrelenting political repression practiced by the
Hussein regime, it should not be overlooked that during the 1970's and early
1980's, Iraq achieved spectacular gains in economic development, which were
largely funded by oil revenues:
With income from petroleum expanding between 1973 and 1978 from
$1.8 billion to $23.6 billion, the Ba'ath transformed agricultural Iraq

uploads/vo135-issue5_2002.pdf(last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
28.

Id. at7.

29.

Id. at7.

30. This followed a 1960 assassination attempt on Qassim that was backed by the CIA.
WILLIAM BLUM, ROGUE STATE 133-34 (2000). The U.S. sought replacement of Qassim for several
reasons: first, Qassim had withdrawn Iraq from the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact in 1961; second, he
had "threatened to occupy Kuwait and nationalized part of the Iraq Petroleum Company;" and third,
he had lifted a ban on the Iraqi Communist Party. Cockbum, supra note 19, at 74.

31. SAID ABURISH, SADDAM HUSSEIN: THE POLITICS OF REVENGE 61 (2000); Simons, The
Making of Iraq, supra note 27, at 7-8. Both maintain that Saddam Hussein personally committed
torture and ordered killings during the Ba'ath's anti-leftist campaign. Some 5,000 persons were
killed, among them many members of Iraq's educated elite. Id.; See generally, SAID ABURISH, A
BRUTAL FRIENDSHIP: THE WEST AND THE ARAB ELITE (1997). Andrew and Patrick Cockbum

assert, however, that Saddam Hussein had no role in the 1963 coup, nor in the massacres that
followed. COCKBURN, supra note 19, at 75.
32. Moushabek, supra note 18, at 30. The RCC, under the constitution, is a body that
"maintained an absolute monopoly of all judicial, legislative and executive authority." Id.
33.

DILIP HIRO, IRAQ IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 54-57 (2002).

34.

MACKEY, supra note 12, at 232-34.
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into a rapidly developing industrialized country. No longer dependent
on taxes or foreign subsidies, government allocations for industry
increased twelve times in those five years, transportation eleven
times, housing nine times. Networks of highways connected town to
town, and electrical lines stretched through the landscape to reach
almost every village. Promising to spin a 'silk thread' between the
government and the common man, the Ba'ath declared jihad against
poor health and illiteracy. Free health care grew quickly available to a
population accustomed to neglect. And schools and literacy programs
proclaiming the slogan "Knowledge is Light, Ignorance is Darkness"
opened everywhere from Baghdad
to the most humble village on the
35
edge of the southern marshes.
Oil wealth contributed to a steadily rising standard of living for ordinary
Iraqis, and the country became a regional employment magnet for workers from
nearby non-oil-producing Arab countries. 36 Gender equality under the Ba'ath
was, perhaps, the most advanced in the Arab world. 3 7 Saddam Hussein's
political legitimacy grew based on his image as a beneficent strongman, whose
repressive tactics were, to a fractious nation weary of political instability, a
38
necessary condition for the country's material advancement.
C. Bleeding Iraq and Iran
In the 1980's, the U.S. contributed materially to the consolidation of
Saddam Hussein's regime and aided in the building of the Iraqi military
capacity. The main reason that the U.S. cultivated Iraq during this period was
that policy makers saw it as a counterweight to Iran, which, as stated above, had

35.

Id. at 229.

36. See generally, SARAH GRAHAM-BROWN & CHRIS TOENSING, MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH
& INFORMATION PROJECT, WHY INVADE IRAQ? A BACKGROUND READER ON THE WAR (2002).
37. Robert Collier, 1991 War Cost Iraqi Women Rights, Polygamy Has Been Legalized,
Schools Segregated, Travel Restricted, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 25, 2003, available at
http://www.sfgate.com /cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/0 1/25/MN215849.DTL (last
visited Jan. 27, 2003).
38.

Davis, supra note 5, at 265. In the words of another commentator:

The system of political rule was primitive, brutal, and cynical-and in its tight circle,
corrupt. But Iraq in general was not a corrupt or corrupted society. The people had
accepted a deal for themselves that the British had invented for the state they created
in 1922: obey and be rewarded, disobey and be punished. Saddam Hussein took this
philosophy to extreme lengths as he built his power base in the 1970s, but for most
Iraqis what his apparatus delivered in terms of education, literacy, health, comfort, and
respect among Middle Eastern neighbors was worth the cost.
Tim Llewellyen, Baghdad Before, COUNTERPUNCH, Jan. 6, 2003, at http://www.counterpunch.org/
llewellyn01062003.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
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undergone revolution in 1979. 39 Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini had denounced all
of the regimes in the Middle East as corrupt and un-Islamic, and made clear that
the secular nationalist Ba'ath regime in Iraq would be among the first targets of
Islamic revolutionary fervor. Within months, the calm that had prevailed along
the Iraq-Iran border since the Algiers Agreement was giving way to skirmishes.
against Saddam
Tehran was urging revolt by the Kurdish and Shi'a Muslims
40
Hussein, and attempting to assassinate senior Iraqi officials.
In September, 1980, with the Iranian officer corps in the throes of a
political purge-and at the discreet urging of the Carter administration-Saddam
Hussein launched a limited war against Iran designed to thwart the hegemonic
ambitions of his stronger neighbor. 4 1 Although seemingly an act of aggression,
and therefore a violation of international law, 42 the war was not an act of
irrational megalomania. Indeed, it " ... was not a reckless adventure; it was an
'4 3
Saddam Hussein depicted his
opportunistic response to a significant threat."
entire Arab world, and Iraq as an "Arab shield"
blow against Iran as one for the
44
expansionism.
Iranian
against

Iraq's aggression against Iran, today cited as one justification for a U.S.-led

war against Irac , was supported diplomatically and, ultimately, militarily by the
United States.
one of neutrality.

Initially, the official U.S. stance with respect to the war was
46
Yet this stance persisted only so long as neither party to the

39. As shall be seen below, a secondary but not insignificant reason for U.S. solicitude
toward Iraq was the lucrative opportunities it afforded U.S. business interests, from arms
manufacturers to agribusiness. Further, as we have already seen, Hussein's previously established
".... anti-Communist credentials would endear him to Washington for most of the next three
decades." Simons, supra note 27, at 8.
40. John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt, An Unnecessary War, FOREIGN POLICY, Jan.
/Feb. 2003, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2003).
41. Id. See BLUM, supra note 1, at 332 (discussing the encouraging role played by the
Carter administration); Alexander Cockburn, Should We Go to War Just Because We Can?, L. A.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2002, at R3; HiRO, supra note 34, at 29.
42. Aggressive war violates Article 2(4) of the United Nations and constitutes a crime
against humanity under the Nuremberg Principles. Michael Ratner, International Law and War
Crimes, in WAR CRIMES: A Report on United States War Crimes Against Iraq to the Commission of
Inquiry for the International War Crimes Tribunal (website organized by Ramsey Clark et al.), at
http:// www.deoxy.org/wc/wc-ilaw.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2003). However, the UN never
adopted a resolution condemning the Iraqi assault nor construing it as an act of aggression. HIRO,
supra note 33, at 237.
43. Mearshimer & Walt, supra note 40. Moushabek states: "In invading Iran, the Ba'athist
regime had multiple specific aims: regaining control over the Shatt al-Arab waterway; establishing
control of Iran's oil-rich Khuzistan (Arabistan) province; breaking down Iraq's regional isolation;
and most importantly, deterring Iran's revolutionary regime from its hostile actions and attempts to
export its Islamic zealotry." Moushabek, supra note 18, at 33.
44.

Moushabek, supra note 18, at 35.

45.

Simons, supra note 27, at 9; see also Moushabek, supra note 18, at 33.

46.

American neutrality involved a stated commitment not to sell arms to either party to the
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bloodletting could obtain decisive strategic advantage. By 1982, Iraq's military
fortunes were flagging, and any pretenses of neutrality were abandoned, as the
47
U.S. swung its power more openly behind Iraq.
U.S. aid to Saddam Hussein's government assumed a variety of forms. In
February 1982, Iraq was removed from the list of state-sponsors of terrorism,
enabling U.S. corporations to ship "dual use" goods (those which had both
civilian and military application) to Iraq. 48 Some $500 million in "dual use"
imports from the United States, ranging from Hughes and Bell helicopters to
computer hardware and software, were directly sent to the Iraqi military with
the certain knowledge of the U.S. government. 49 Dozens of biological agents,
including strains of anthrax, were sent to Iraq under license from the U.S.
Department of Commerce and formed the basis of that country's biological
50
weapons program.
Iraq was made eligible for assistance through the Department of
Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and to the delight of farmstate politicians in the United States, became the ninth largest purchaser of U.S.
grains by 1989.51 Full diplomatic relations between Iraq and the U.S. were
restored in 1984.52 At the height of the "tanker war," when Iraq and Iran
exchanged attacks on Gulf shipping, the United States "reflagged" tankers under
U.S. colors and provided them naval protection against Iranian attack, sinking

conflict. Sarah Graham-Brown notes: "Ironically, the only exception to this ban on commercial
sales of defense items was if the items were for the protection of the head of state. As a result of the
exception, license applications valued at $48 million were approved." SARAH GRAHAM-BROWN,
SANCTIONING SADDAM 3 (1999).
47. Michael Dobbs, The U.S. HadKey Role in Iraq Buildup, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2002, at
Al. While the main aim of U.S. support to Iraq was to fortify a bulwark against Iranian power, as
Mackey points out:
Other reasons were involved in the policy shift: the hope that Hussein might serve a
constructive role in the ever present Arab-Israeli dispute, the realization that oil-rich
Iraq represented an untapped market for U. S. industry and agriculture, and desire to
wean Baghdad away from Moscow once and for all.
MACKEY, supranote 12, at 340.
48.

Davis, supra note 5, at 257.

49. MACKEY, supra note 12, at 341. Investigations into Commerce Department records
show that export licenses were approved for goods sent to the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Ministry of
Defense, and a variety of Iraqi state enterprises that were engaged in military research and
development. DIGITAL NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, IRAQGATE: SADDAM HUSSEIN, U.S. POLICY
AND THE PRELUDE TO THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, 1980-1994, at http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com
/igessayx.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2003).
50.

Dobbs, supra note 47, at Al.

51.

JAMES BAKER, THE POLITICS OF DIPLOMACY 263 (1995); see also MACKEY, supra note

12, at 340.
52.

Davis, supra note 5, at 257.
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six Iranian war vessels and attacking Iranian oil platforms. 53 Also, the U.S.
quickly accepted Iraq's apology for an apparently accidental Iraqi missile attack
on the USS Stark that claimed thirty-seven sailors' lives. 54 American satellite
images depicting Iranian troop deployments were also shared with Iraq,
decisively influencing some of the war's major battles. 55 The U.S. also
monitored arm sales by other countries to Iraq to insure that its military needs
orchestrated sales of cluster bombs to Iraq from
were being met, and apparently
56
a company based in Chile.
There is abundant evidence that U.S. policy makers were fully aware of the
murderous characteristics of the Hussein regime, and of its repeated uses of
chemical weapons in the war against Iran. 57 In November 1983, Secretary of
State George Schultz was informed by a senior department official of
intelligence reports indicating that Iranian troops were being subjected to
"almost daily use of CW [chemical weapons]" by the Iraqis. 58 On March 24,
1984, Donald Rumsfeld was in Baghdad negotiating, as President Reagan's
emissary, the re-establishment of diplomatic ties with Iraq when the UN issued
59
a report confirming Iraq's use of poison gas against Iranian soldiers.
Declassified State Department notes of Rumsfeld's meetings with Iraqi officials,
including Saddam Hussein, reflect no discussion of the topic of Iraqi use of
Iran, except in passing, as something that "inhibited"
chemical weapons against
60
closer U.S.-Iraqi ties.
In March 1988, in the waning days of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi soldiers were
attempting to re-establish control over the Iraqi Kurdish village of Halabja,
which had been occupied by Iranian troops. 6 1 Chemical bombs were dropped,
killing an estimated 5,000 Iraqi Kurds. 62 This is the famed incident that is now
the basis of the claim that Saddam Hussein has used weapons of mass

53.

Simons, supra note 27, at 9.

54.

Id; see also MACKEY, supra note 12, at 341.

55.

PHYTHIAN, supra note 6, at 40; see also MACKEY, supra note 13, at 341-42.

56. Dobbs, supra note 47, at Al; see also Kurt Nimmo, Bush Senior: Hating Saddam,
Selling Him Weapons, COUNTERPUNCH, Sept. 19, 2002, at http://www.counterpunch.org/nimmo
0919.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003). The U.S. apparently turned a blind eye to shipments of U.S.
armaments to Iraq from several of its Arab allies, including Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab
Emirates. GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46, at 3.
57. Christopher Dickey & Evan Thomas, How Saddam Happened, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23,
2002, at 34.
58.

Dobbs, supra note 47, at Al.

59. Jeremy Scahill, The Saddam in Rummy's Closet, COUNTERPUNCH, Aug. 2, 2002, at
http://www.counterpunch.org/scahilO802.html (last visited Jan. II, 2003).
60.

Dobbs, supra note 47, at AI.

61.

Scahill, supra note 59.

62.

id.
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destruction against his own people, which is another of the current justifications
for a possible U.S. invasion of Iraq. Tellingly, however, the Reagan
administration at the time defended Iraq and State Department officials were
instructed to publicly blame Iran for the attack. 63 Congressional efforts to
impose economic sanctions on Iraq were snuffed out by the White House,
pleading the importance of ongoing U.S.-Iraqi cooperation, the loss of
commercial opportunities for U.S. businesses, and probable counterproductivity of sanctions. 64 It was, in all senses, too profitable a relationship to
abandon.
At no time during the eight-year Iran-Iraq bloodbath, however, was U.S.
military and economic support for Iraq sufficient to permit an outright military
victory for Iraq. Indeed, at times, the U.S. supported or encouraged arms aid to
Iran, mostly through Israel. 65 This cynical policy was designed to secure, in the
words of Henry Kissiner, the "ultimate American interest" in the Iran-Iraq war:
that "both sides lose." 6 Lose they did, and in tragic proportions. By the time
both countries had accepted a UN-sponsored ceasefire in 1988, the war had
taken as many as 1,000,000 Iraqi and Iranian lives, and may have cost the two
countries as much as $1 trillion. 67 One cannot be certain of this, but it seems
highly improbable that U.S. decision makers would have deliberately fueled
such an orgy of destruction, and facilitated Iraq's use of horrific weapons, were

63. Joost R. Hilterman, The U.S. Didn't Seem to Mind Gas Attack, INTERN'L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 17, 2003, at 2003 WL 4534113. There has been some controversy over responsibility for the
Halabja attack. A 1990 Pentagon report concluded " ... it seemed likely that it was the Iranian
bombardment that had actually killed the Kurds." STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE ET AL., IRAQI POWER
AND U.S. SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 52 (1990). Some have disputed the conclusions of this

report, noting that its overall thrust was to advocate continuation of a close U.S.-Iraqi alliance See
Mike Langridge, Who is Responsible for the Deaths of Iraqi civilians, at http://
members.fortunecity.com/britonsvbUsh/articles/gas.html#update (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
Perhaps the most judicious assessment of the tragedy at Halabja is that responsibility for the deaths
of the villagers is indeterminable. Id. Other Iraqi villages may have been gassed, although some
only after warnings of several weeks to evacuate. Jude Wanniski, Where did Saddam coine from?
Part I, at http://www.polyconomics.com/searchbase/02-18-98.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2003); see
RICK FRANCONA, FROM ALLY TO ADVERSARY 24-25 (1999) (discussing Iraq's use of chemical
weapons against Iranian soldiers; see generally, STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE ET AL., IRAQ AND THE
INTERNATIONAL OIL SYSTEM 205-206 (2001).
64. Dickey & Thomas, supra note 57, at 34; see also Dobbs, supra note 47, at Al;
GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46, at 6.
65. PHYTHIAN, supra note 6, at 33. However, the U.S. was not alone in supporting both
sides of the Iran-Iraq conflict; a total of 28 nations sold arms to both Iraq and Iran during the course
of the war. Id. at 24.
66. Davis, supra note 5, at 256 ; see also MACKEY, supra note 12, at 340; Blum, supra note
I, at 332. This is reminiscent of U.S. support for the Kurds in the mid-1970s, mitigated to such a
degree as to guarantee permanent conflict.
67. Wanniski, supra note 63. Bahbah maintains that the costs to Iraq alone were $500
billion. Bishara Bahbah, The Crisis in the Gulf- Why Iraq invaded Kuwait, in BEYOND THE STORM
52 (Phyllis Bennis & Michel Moushabek eds., 1999). An additional 1.8 million Iraqi and Iranians
were wounded in the fighting. PHYTHIAN, supra note 6, at 3.

HeinOnline -- 7 J. Gender Race & Just. 12 2003

Facing Tyranny with Justice
these not two brown-skinned, Muslim peoples, battling it out on the far side of
the globe.
The U.S. fomented aggression by Iraq against Iran, and its subsequent
sponsorship, of Iraq aided and prolonged that aggression. Accomplice liability
is a well-recognized concept in international law. 6 8 Although U.S. acts did not
target Iraq in this instance, it is arguable, nonetheless, that the U.S. was culpable
for violations of international law. This was so both in relation to Iraq's crime
against peace in attacking Iran and in relation to Iraq's use of proscribed
chemical and biological weapons, some of which were of American
69
provenance.
The U.S. continued in its cultivation of Saddam Hussein in the aftermath
of the Iran-Iraq war, even after allegations surfaced that Iraq had participated in
bank fraud and corruption in the U.S. Department of Agriculture's CCC
program. 70 This policy was consecrated in National Security Directive 26 of
October, 1989, concluding that "normal relations between the United States and
Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the
Gulf and the Middle East." 7 1 High officials in both the Reagan and first Bush
administrations repeatedly defended close cooperation with Iraq. 72 In 1989,
Saddam Hussein hosted a visit from senior American business executives from
such major U.S. corporations as Amoco, Mobile, Westinghouse, General
Motors, Xerox, and others. 73 By 1990, annual trade between the U.S. and Iraq

68. As Professor William Schabas points out, many of the Nazi leaders in the Nuremberg
Trials were held liable as accomplices to crimes against peace and against humanity. Complicity,
according to Schabas, requires: First, "proof that the underlying or predicate crime has been
committed by another person . . .Second, there must be a material act by which the accomplice
actually contributes to the perpetration of the crime... Thirdly, the accomplice's act must be carried
out with intent and with knowledge of the perpetrator's act." WILLIAM SCHABAS, INT'L
COMMISSION OF THE RED CROSS, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: CATCHING

THE ACCOMPLICES, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS No.42, INT'L COMMISSION OF THE
Graphics/439at
http://www.icrc.org/WEBGRAPH.NSF/
CROSS
at
447-48,
RED

460_Schabas.pdf/$FILE/439-460_Schabas.pdf.
69. Development, production, and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons is barred under the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), signed that
same year by both Iraq and the United States. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. The BTWC came into force in
March 1975, augmenting pre-existing provisions of the Geneva Conventions that similarly
prohibited use of such weapons. About the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, available at
http://www.opbw.org/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
70. Russ W. Baker, Iraqgate, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar./Apr. 1993, at http://
www.cjr.org/year/93/2/iraqgate.asp (last visited Jan. 11,2003).
71.

MACKEY, supra note 12, at 342-43.

72.

DIGITAL NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, supra note 49.

73.

Simons, supra note 27, at 9.
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had reached $3.5 billion. 74 On April 12, 1990, a delegation of five U.S.
Senators, led by Robert Dole and Alan Simpson, met with Saddam Hussein
during which the senators commiserated with Saddam Hussein over criticisms
of him in the American press, derided by Simpson as "haughty and
pampered" 75
Just weeks before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990, U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State, John Kelly, testified in Congress that, while Iraq's
human rights record was "abysmal," economic sanctions were still
inappropriate. 76 Economic and military support continued until the eve of Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. On August 1, 1990, the day before the invasion, President
Bush authorized sales of advanced data transmission technology to Iraq. 77 As
Geoff Simons observes:
In 1990, Saddam Hussein-having been provided with substantial
military support by the United States, protected from sanctions by
successive U.S. administrations, and negotiating business deals with
top American executives-had every reason to believe that his happy
relationship with Washington would continue. He had protected the
pro-U.S. gulf states from a resurgent Islamic fundamentalism, for
which he had paid an enormous cost in men and treasure. What
Saddam now wanted was to rebuild Iraq with the help of his former
78
allies.
This is how matters stood in the months leading to Hussein's fateful decision to
invade neighboring Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
D. The Fall From Grace
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait looks to have been the decisive turning point in
U.S. policy toward Saddam Hussein. At one level, at least, it certainly was.
Virtually overnight, the Hussein regime came to be publicly depicted as a
dangerous liability rather than a strategic asset. 79 Yet Washington's perceptions
of Saddam Hussein had begun to shift even earlier. This process may have

74.

GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46, at 4.

75. Gilbert Cranberg, Glaspies Cable Sets Record Straight, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov.
10, 1991, at 8D.

76. Hearing on US-Iraq Relations Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 101 st Cong.
(1990) (statement of Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly).
77. GEOFF SIMONS, THE SCOURGING OF IRAQ 74-75 (1998). The support included sales of
pesticides to Iraq in December 1988 by Dow Chemical, that were amenable to use as chemical
weapons. Dobbs, supra note 47, at A l.
78.

Simons, supra note 27, at 9-10.

79. Marjorie Williams, Monster in the Making: From Unknown to Arch-Villain in a Matter
of Days, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1990, at DOI.
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begun as early as 1989 when the U.S. military conducted simulation exercises
in repelling a hypothetical Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia. 80 In
April 1990, Saddam Hussein, may have sealed his fate when, in a speech to his
army, he threatened to retaliate against any Israeli use of nuclear weaponry with
his own chemical weapons. 8 1 In effect, this underscored the fact that Iraq was
emerging as a potential challenger to Israeli military82 dominance that rested
ultimately on its regional monopoly over nuclear arms.
Iraq's attack against another sovereign Arab country was quickly, and
deservedly, condemned within the UN. 83 The attack is now frequently cited as
further evidence that Saddam is a megalomaniacal "serial aggressor,"
undeterrable and, therefore, an appropriate target for "regime change" or
worse. 84 It is important, therefore, to understand the sequence of events leading
up to Iraq's Kuwait misadventure in somewhat greater detail. The reality is that
the attack, wholly illegal and unjustified, was not an act of an irrational leader
bent, against all reason, on expansion. In fact, Iraq had longstanding and
with Kuwait and initially attempted to resolve
seemingly legitimate grievances
85
them through negotiations.
As this article has already hinted, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a direct
outgrowth of the Iran-Iraq war. 86 Iraq had entered into the Iran war flush with
reserves of $35 billion, but limped out of it with $80-100 billion in debt,
approximately half of it held by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates. 8 7 In Saddam Hussein's view, his nation had sacrificed mightily on
behalf of all Arabs-indeed, fears of Iran were the very reason the militarily
vulnerable Arab Gulf states had underwritten the Iraqi war effort to the extent
they had. 8 8 With Iraq's economy in tatters, Hussein sought relief from his Arab

80.

BLUM, supra note 1, at 324.

81.

Davis, supra note 5 at 275.

82.

Simons, supra note 27 at 10.

83.

S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/0660 (1990).

84. See, eg., Kenneth Pollack, Next Stop Baghdad, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar. /Apr. 2002, at
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/2002030l faessay7970/kenneth-m-pollack/next-stop-baghdad.html
(last visited January 13, 2003); Will Marshall, Making the Case on Iraq, BLUEPRINT, at
http://www.ndol.org/blueprint/2002-sep-oct/16_iraq.html (last visited Jan. 13, 3002). White House
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer argued on October 1, 2002, that "one bullet" would be the most cost
effective way to dispose of President Hussein. Washington Post Staff Writer, Washington Would
Welcome Hussein Assassination, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2002, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/ ac2/wp-dyn/A28904-20020ctl?language=printer (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
85.

Mearshimer & Walt, supra note 40.

86. Steve A. Yetiv, The Outcomes of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Some
Antecedent Causes, 107 POL. SCIENTIST Q. 195, 197-98 (1992).

87.

PHYTHIAN, supra note 6, at 292.

88.

Id. at 292.
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neighbors in the form of cash and loan forgiveness. 89 He also sought
sympathetic resolution of a dispute with Kuwait over two islands in the Shatt alArab that would secure Iraqi shipping access to the Gulf.90
Aggravating matters, Kuwait was consistently over-producing its OPECset oil-production quotas, driving the price of oil down, and with it, Iraq's oil
revenues. 9 1 In an Arab summit meeting in Baghdad in May 1990, Saddam
Hussein likened Kuwaiti tactics to economic warfare, stating that every U.S.

dollar drop in the price of oil caused an annual loss to Iraq of $1 billion.92 The
Kuwaiti response was not just unsympathetic, it was insulting, the emir offered

Iraq a paltry $500,000.

93

The Iraqi leader next tested the waters regarding possible U.S. reaction to a
military action against Kuwait. A series of public statements by U.S. officials
stressed the fact that the U.S. had no treaty obligations to defend Kuwait. 9 4 On

July 24, 1990, in the last direct meeting between Saddam Hussein and a U.S.
official, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie stated:
I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know
you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you

should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no
opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with
95

Kuwait.
Although the ambassador went on to express concern over the possible use of

force by Iraq, in hindsight, it is evident that Hussein interpreted these statements

89.

Id. at 292.

90. The dispute dated from World War 1,when Kuwait, then part of the Basra district of the
Ottoman Empire, was severed from Iraq by the stroke of a British colonial pen, but the disposition
of the two islands were left ambiguous. Over time, Iraq grudgingly came to accept the forced
separation. Surely this legacy contributed to Iraq's sense that Kuwait's sovereignty was something of
a contrivance. See Hala Fattah, From Regionalism to Nation-State: A Short History of Kuwait, in
BEYOND THE STORM 37-49 (Phyllis Bennis & Michel Moushabeck eds., 1991); Bahbah, supra note
67, at 50-5 I.
91.

Simons, supra note 27, at 10.

92.

Id.

93. Bahbah, supra note 67, at 52. Iraq had also accused Kuwait of permitting slant-drilling
into the Rumaila oil fields, which extend from Iraq into Kuwait, and siphoning off excessive shares
of oil. Id.
94. On July 24, 1990, U.S. Department of State spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler clarified
the absence of "any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security
commitments to Kuwait." Simons, supra note 27, at 10-13. Shortly thereafter, Under Secretary of
State John Kelly suggested that an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would be cause for great concern, but
would not oblige an armed U.S. response. Id. at 2-3; BLUM, supra note I, at 321-22 (providing
additional examples).
95.

Simons, supra note 27, at 10; see also Mearshimer & Walt, supra note 40.
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as a "green light" for an invasion of Kuwait. 96 Just over one week later, after
another failed attempt to negotiate a resolution with Kuwait, Iraqi tanks
rumbled across the border into Kuwait City against token resistance.
To be clear, the point is not that the invasion of Kuwait was legally or
morally permissible: it was neither. It was a ruthless act of aggression against
another sovereign nation and a clear violation of international law.9 7 However,
the invasion was not the act of a reckless madman, as it has sometimes been
portrayed. Rather it was, from the Iraqi perspective, consistent with past actions
that the U.S. had tolerated. 98 However, it should be obvious that speaking
purely pragmatically, Saddam Hussein's real error was not in committing
unprovoked aggression, rather his mistake was attacking a nation regarded as
critical to American strategic interests.
99

E. "DesertHOlocaust"

As we know, Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait in the face of UN
resolutions demanding that it do so. Ultimately, Iraqi troops were forcibly
ejected from Kuwait by coalition forces composed of twenty-eight nations, the
military operation led by the U.S. was dubbed "Desert Storm." 1 0 The fact that
the UN Security Council ultimately blessed enforcement of its resolutions
demanding Iraqi withdrawal using "all necessary means, 1° 1 implicitly
including the use of force, appears to foreclose the question as to the legality of
the attack against Iraq by the coalition cobbled together by the United States.
Yet, this is only partially true.
There is considerable reason to believe that Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait
could have been secured peacefully. The very day of Iraq's invasion, the UN
Security Council passed UN Security Council Resolution 660, demanding Iraqi
withdrawal and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. 102 Four days

96. Mearshimer & Walt, supra note 40. In addition to this, compelling evidence assembled
by author William Blum indicate that the United States may have lured Iraq into invading Kuwait to
provide a pretext for an American attack on Iraq. The evidence and analysis are too complex to
reproduce here and should be read in the original text. BLUM, supra note 1,at 321-25.
97.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.

98. Mearshimer & Walt, supra note 40. Other factors contributed to Hussein's decision to
invade Kuwait. His regime was internally weakened and faced substantial unrest among highranking officers in the military; the attack on Kuwait served to unify the military against an outside
force. PHYTHIAN, supra note 6, at 292; see also Bahbah, supra note 67, at 68; Davis, supra note 5,
at 271.
99.

BLUM, supra note 1,at 321-25.

100.

HIRO, supra note 33, at 37.

101.

S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/0678 (1990).

102.

S.C. Res. 660, supra note 83.
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later it was followed by UN Security Council Resolution 661, noting Iraq's
failure to comply with UNSCR 660, and imposed comprehensive, multilateral
economic sanctions on Iraq. 103 Many members of the international community,
including France and the Soviet Union, counseled patience, preferring to allow
the sanctions to take their course. 104
Iraq offered several times before the ground war commenced against it
to withdraw from Kuwait, although these were diplomatic openings that were
never seriously explored. 10 5 On the contrary, from early in the crisis, the United
States committed itself to war and actively sought to persuade other nations to
support its initiative. Speaking of UNSCR Resolution 678, which authorized
"all necessary means" to effect Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, former Secretary
of State James Baker wrote in his memoirs: "I met personally with all my
Security Council counterparts in an intricate process of cajoling, extracting,
10 6
threatening, and occasionally buying votes."
The Bush administration also engaged in a sustained campaign to "sell" the
107
war to a then skeptical American public with the aid of a credulous press.
Pentagon representations that 250,000 Iraqi troops had taken up positions in
Kuwait were accepted without challenge, even after some news organizations
possessed satellite imagery casting doubt on Pentagon claims. 10 8 Many will
also remember the widely publicized allegation that Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait had
thrown babies from their incubators in a Kuwait City hospital. It was later
revealed that this incident was a hoax concocted by Kuwaiti interests in the
United States working with renowned public relations firm Hill and
Knowlton. 109 Saddam Hussein, still just weeks removed from a decades-long
1
partnership with the U.S., was relentlessly vilified as a "new Hitler." 10

103.

S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/0661 (1990).

104.

GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46, at 9.

105.

Davis, supra note 5, at 269-70.

106. JAMES BAKER, THE POLITICS OF DIPLOMACY 303 (1995). A list of emoluments
offered to gain "yes" votes was compiled by U.S. Representative Henry Gonzalez. Ratner, supra
note 42. It includes $7 billion in loan forgiveness to Egypt; $7 billion in aid from various countries
and U.S. food shipments for the Soviet Union; unblocking a $140 million World Bank loan to
China; and others. Id. Among the states that was threatened, unsuccessfully, was Yemen, whose
entire aid from the United States of $70 million was cut for its "no" vote. See generally, Phyllis
Bennis, False Consensus: George Bush's United Nations, in BEYOND THE STORM 112 (Phyllis
Bennis & Michel Moushabek eds., 1991).
107.

MACARTHUR, supra note

108.

Id.

1,at 172-77.

109. Id.; see also Ian Urbina, Broadcast Ruse, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. I1, 2002, at
http://www.merip.org/newspaperopeds/lUbroadcast-ruse.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
110. There was a marked tendency in the American press toward personification of the
conflict, as if "Saddam" (who rated neither a title nor full name) were indistinguishable from Iraq
and its people. Ali Abunimah and Rania Masri, The Media's Deadly Spin on Iraq, in IRAQ UNDER
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The preference of U.S. policy-makers for a military response to the Kuwait
crisis was doubtlessly grounded in a number of factors. Chief among these
factors was the fear of the breakdown of the fragile consensus in support of
sanctions and the inability of the United States to achieve its strategic objectives
within the framework of a peaceful resolution. I Specifically, Iraq had become
too strong a regional power for American comfort, and threatened to diminish
longstanding Israeli military dominance in the Middle East. Iraqi power could
only have been thoroughly removed through the medium of war. 112
Therefore, the goal of the United States was not simply to force Iraqi3
withdrawal from Kuwait, nor even to cripple the Iraqi military as such. 1
Instead, the U.S. aim was to actualize the threat, issued by then-Secretary of
State James Baker to Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz, to render Iraq a "weak
and backward" state, and thereby eliminate Iraq as a contestant for regional
leadership for the foreseeable future. 114 At a broader level, cutting Iraq down to
size would demonstrate to the world, and especially ambitious Third World
potentates, the readiness of the U.S. to deploy military force in the soon to be
post-Soviet "New World Order."
Nonetheless, the UN Security Council's endorsement of the use of force to
eject Iraqi troops from Kuwait in UN Security Council Resolution 678115
renders any argument that the U.S.-led coalition attack was in itself a violation
of international law exceedingly problematic. 1 16 However, the scale of the
U.S.-led attack vastly exceeded :that necessary to implement the internationally
agreed upon aims of ejecting Iraq from Kuwait and restoring Kuwait's
legitimate government that were first articulated in Security Council Resolution
SIEGE 83 (Anthony Amove ed., 2000); Davis, supra note 5, at 264-68; see also Williams, supra
note 79, at DOI.
111.

BAKER, supra note 106, at 301; see also, GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46, at 10.

112.

Davis, supra note 5, at 274-75; see also MACKEY, supra note 12, at 338.

113.

Davis, supra note 5, at 274-75.

114.

Baker, supra note 106, at 359.

115.

S.C. Res. 678, supra note 101.

116. In principle, of course, the Security Council is bound under Article 24(2) to uphold the
purposes of the UN Charter, and therefore could not legally authorize an aggressive war. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 24, para. 2, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapter5.html.
Therefore, it is not impossible to make a claim that the U.S.-led coalition's use of force constituted,
as an aggressive war, a crime against peace under the Nuremberg principles, and a violation of the
UN Charter. See Francis Boyle, U.S. War Crimes During the Gulf War, COUNTERPIYNCH, Sept. 2,

2002, at http://www.counterpunch.org/boyle0902.html. However, the Security Council may only
authorize the use of force under Article 42 following a finding of a threat to international peace and
security, and after concluding that other measures have been insufficient to abate the threat. A
finding had been made in UNSCR 660 that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait constituted such a breach,
and by the time UNSCR 678 was passed, both sanctions and diplomacy had been employed
unsuccessfully. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 101. An argument that the coalition violated international

law against aggressive war must essentially show that, in fact, pacific measures had not been
exhausted and that force was not necessary.
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660.117 Given American objectives, this inevitably led to numerous general and
specific violations of the law of nations and humanitarian law. 118
Desert Storm commenced on January 16, 1990, with a furious aerial
bombardment of Iraqi troop positions within Kuwait and of the civilian
infrastructure in Baghdad, Basra, and other major cities in Iraq. 119 The U.S., as
the driving force behind the coalition and the provider of most of its military
muscle, asserted de facto command of military operations, ensuring the primacy
of U.S. strategic goals for the operation. 120
Within a week, coalition forces had flown 12,000 sorties over Iraq and
Kuwait. 12 1 By the end of the war on February 27, some 88,000 tons of
munitions had been dropped. 122 This was the equivalent of one Hiroshima-size
atomic bomb per week for the roughly seven weeks of the war, making it the
most concentrated aerial bombardment in human history. 123 Destroyed in the
onslaught were eighteen of Iraq's twenty power-generating facilities, 124 water
treatment plants, dams, telecommunications equipment, food-processing and
distribution plants, bridges, roads, bus and train stations, factories, schools and
universities, and as many as 20,000 homes and dwellings. 125 Mosques,
churches, and historical sites were struck as well. 126 In the words of a UN

117. Eleven other resolutions on the Kuwait crisis passed by the Security Council before
force was authorized in UNSCR 678, which did not significantly alter these two basic objectives,
but rather sought different methods (economic embargoes, blockades) to implement them. Scott
Silliman, The Iraqi Quagmire: Enforcing the No-Fly Zones, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 767, 767 (2002).
118. Mackey phrases it somewhat more delicately: "To the international law of conduct, the
United States added its own strategic goals. Foremost among American objectives was to reduce
Iraq's military capability to the point that Saddam Hussein could never again threaten his
neighbors." MACKEY, supra note 12, at 346.
119. Steve Niva, The Battle is Joined, in BEYOND THE STORM 66 (Phyllis Bennis & Michel
Moushabek eds., 1991). This followed a six-week "grace period" after the passage of UN Security
Council Resolution 678, during which Iraq was given a last opportunity to withdraw peacefully
from Kuwait. Id.
120. This was enabled by the fact that the Security Council ceded direction of the military
effort to the coalition forces and failed to establish a collective command answerable to the Council
as envisioned by the UN Charter. The Security Council then declined to convene publicly on the
issue until the fighting had ended. GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46, at 11.
121.

/d. at 67.

122.

Simons, supra note 27, at 4-5.

123.

Id.; BLUM, supra note I, at 320.

124. David Cortright, A Hard Look at Sanctions, THE NATION, December 3, 2001, at
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20011203&s=cortright (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
125.

SIMONS, supra note 77, at 12.

126. Deborah Solomon, Iraq's Cultural Capital, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 5, 2003, at 15.
Article 53 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977, bars acts of hostility against
cultural property, including historical sites and places of worship. Protocol I Additional to the
Geneva Conventions, 1977, available at http://www.deoxy.org/wc/wc-proto.htm.
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inspector, the war wrought "near apocalyptic results" on Iraq. 127 Iraq had been
modem society's
reduced to a "pre-industrial age," yet with all of a 128
survival.
for
like,
the
and
sewers,
electricity,
on
dependencies
Ground operations were commenced by coalition forces on February 23,
producing a total rout of Iraqi troops within 100 hours. 129 One hundred and
thirty-seven American soldiers were killed in the fighting.13 0 Estimates of Iraqi
casualties range between 100,000 to 200,000, at least half of whom were noncombatants. 13 1 Thousands, if not tens of thousands, of Iraqi troops, Kuwaiti and
other civilians were obliterated as they fled Kuwait in full retreat toward
Basra. 132 These troops and civilians retreated along the "Highway of Death," as
it became known, after Baghdad radio had broadcast Iraq's unconditional
surrender and ordered Iraqi troops to withdraw from Kuwait:
The skies cleared on February 26 to reveal the snarling traffic jam of
Iraqi vehicles and troops desperately scrambling to get out of Kuwait,
and the most horrific slaughter of the war thus far commenced. U.S.
and coalition attack helicopters, missile launchers, fighter-bombers,
and B-52's rained explosives and bursting shrapnel on the stricken
Iraqi withdrawal, resulting in total carnage. 133

Report on humanitarian needs in Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment by a
GENERAL FOR ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT, AHTISAARI REPORT, March 1991 10-17, at http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/
info/undocs/s22366.html.
127.

mission to the area led by the Under-Secretary.

128.

Id.

129. Seymour Hersh, Overwhelming Force: What Happened in the Final Days of the Gulf
War?, THE NEW YORKER, May 22, 2000, at 1-2, available at http://www.polyconomics.com/
sy.html. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict during the weeks of the aerial bombardment, and
before the commencement of the ground war, were undertaken by the Soviet Union and Iran, but
"U.S. and Great Britain remained locked in a no-ceasefire, no-withdrawal, nothing-less-thansurrender scenario." Bennis, supra note 106, at 122.
130. Thousands of others, however, have in subsequent years developed symptoms of"Gulf
War syndrome," possibly due to battlefield exposure to toxic substances. See, e.g., Richard Lieby,
The Fallout of War, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2002, at Cl.
131. Simons, supra note 77, at 15-16. As Simons reports, an American demographer with
the U.S. Census Bureau estimated the number of Iraqi casualties at 158,000.
132.

Niva, supra note 119, at 70.

133. Id. at 69-70. On March 2, 1990, two days after the ceasefire, an American mechanized
division led by Major General Barry McCaffrey-later federal "drug czar" under President Clintonattacked a retreating Iraqi tank division, claiming that Iraqi troops had initiated fire. Hersh, supra
note 129, at 1-2.
Apache attack helicopters, Bradley fighting vehicles, and artillery units from the 24th
[U.S.] division pummeled the five-mile long Iraqi column for hours, destroying some
seven hundred Iraqi tanks, armored cars, and trucks, killing not only Iraqi soldiers but
civilians and children as well. Many of the dead were buried soon after the
engagement, and no accurate count of the victims could be made.
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Other Iraqi troops of unknown number were killed when they were buried
alive in their trenches by coalition force bulldozers. 134 Wanton slaughter of
troops who are wounded, captured, or otherwise "out of combat," as troops
retreating in the aftermath of a ceasefire, constitutes a war crime under
customary laws of warfare.

13 5

The catalogue of weapons used against the

hapless Iraqis on the "Highway of Death" may have included a number of
136
banned explosives, including fuel-air bombs, napalm, and other incinerants.
Virtually all the Gulf War killing was concealed from the media, and

consequently the public, through strict control of media access to the battlefield.
Instead, information and images were selectively doled out to reporters that
magnified the military accomplishments of the coalition, while fostering the
appearance of a "war without death." 137 President Bush assigned the task of

managing perceptions of the war to then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney,
' 13 8

who later admitted: "I did not look on the press as an asset."

While Iraq's "eco-terrorism" was widely publicized and lamented, coalition

forces also bombed refineries, tankers, and other oil industry fixtures, causing
severe ecological damage. 13 9 Coalition forces also fired an estimated 300 tons

of high-density, armor-piercing depleted uranium projectiles, the remnants of
which still remain to contaminate Iraqi soil.

140

Two operating nuclear power

Id. Subsequent investigations cast strong doubt as to the veracity of McCaffrey's claim that his unit
was attacked first. Id.
134. SIMONS, supra note 77 at 9; Patrick J. Sloyan, War without death, The Pentagon
Promotes a Vision of Combat as Bloodless and Antiseptic, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 17, 2002, at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=-/chronicle/archive/2002/11/17/INI78228.DTL (last
visited Mar. 13, 2003).
135.

Boyle, supra note 116.

136. Id.; see also CHRIS HEDGES, WAR
(describing the results in a chilling manner).

IS A FORCE THAT GIVES US MEANING 85

(2002)

137. Sloyan, supra note 134. "More than 70 reporters were arrested, detained, and
threatened at gunpoint and literally chased from the front lines when they attempted to defy
Pentagon rules." Id. For additional discussions on both restrictions over news reportage of the war
and complicity of U.S. media in obscuring the truth, see Laura Flanders, Restricting Reality: Media
Mind Games and the War, in BEYOND THE STORM 160-70 (Phyllis Bennis & Michel Moushabek
eds., 199 1); see also Abunimah & Masri, supra note 110, at 83; See generally, MACARTHUR, supra
note 1.
138.

Sloyan, supra note 134.

139. Penny Kemp, For Generations to Come: the Environmental Catastrophe,in BEYOND
THE STORM 325-34 (Phyllis Bennis & Michel Moushabek eds., 1991).
140. While the health-jeopardizing effects of depleted uranium are unconfirmed, there are
many reports of increased rates of cancer and birth defects in Southern Iraq. Hadani Ditmars, War
Brought Misery to Iraqi Town: Once-Lovely Iraqi Resort Now Filled With Suffering; Gulf War
Brought Era of Pollution and Cancer, S. F. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2002, at HI; see also Robert Collier,
Iraq Links Cancers to Uranium weapons, U.S. Likely to Use Arms Again in War, S.F. CHRON. Jan.
13, 2003, at Al, available at http://www.sfgate. com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/ chronicle/
archive/2003/ 01/13/MN233872.DTL (last visited Jan. 16, 2003).
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plants were also destroyed. 14 1 Specific rules of international humanitarian law
contained in Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions prohibit widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. These provisions of
14 2
the Geneva Convention were violated repeatedly by coalition forces.
Estimates for the restoration of Iraq's destroyed assets were placed at $200
14 3
billion.
Keeping in mind the limited purposes for which force was authorized by
UNSCR 678, it is apparent that the deliberate targeting of Iraq's civilian
infrastructure by coalition forces violated two principles that are at the
foundation of international humanitarian law: the principle of distinction, and
the principle of proportionality. The principle of distinction prohibits direct
attacks on civilians or those that fail to discriminate between civilian and
military objectives. Where attacks with military objectives also have civilian
impacts, as with many of the sites bombed in Iraq by the coalition forces, the
principle of proportionality requires that such impact not be excessive "in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."' 14 4 It is not
inconceivable that some military advantage was derived from the bombings
throughout Iraq, often many miles from the Kuwait battlefield. But the
extensive destruction visited by coalition bombings on Iraq caused terrible
direct and indirect losses among Iraqi civilians, far disproportionate to any

141.

See generally, BLUM, supra note I.

142. Article 55 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions requires that "Care
shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term, and
severe damage." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol 1),June 8, 1977, art. 55, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol 1]. Article 56 protects "works and installations containing
dangerous forces", such as dikes, dams, and nuclear generating plants. Id.; Protocol I, art. 56, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3. It goes without saying that Iraqi abuses of the environment during the battle were also
egregious violations of international law.
143.

SIMONS, supra note 77, at 12.

144. Both are customary norms of international law that have been codified in Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Protocol 1,supra note 142. Article 48 of Protocol I
stipulates: "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives." Id. Article 51(2) defines military objectives "those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling
at the time, offers a definite military advantage," and further states that "the civilian population as
such, as well as individual citizens, shall not be the object of attack." Id. Article 51(5) bars
indiscriminate attacks, or "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. It is also possible to view
coalition military operations that exceeded the scope of the mandate of UNSCR 678 as a violation
of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Cf Kenneth Rizer, Bombing Dual-Use Targets:
Legal, Ethical, and Doctrinal Perspectives, AIR AND SPACE POWER CHRONICLES, May 1, 2001, at
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Rizer.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
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reasonable military advantage gained in the Kuwait theater. We have already
seen that as many as half of Iraqi direct casualties, in other words, 50-100,000,
were civilians. 145 Over time, indirect losses of lives caused by degradation of
the civilian infrastructure would be far greater.
These losses were not only foreseen by U.S. military planners, but, in at
least some cases, they were deliberately inflicted with non-military purposes in
mind. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of the destruction of Iraqi's
water supply. During the aerial bombardment of Iraq:
[T]he country's eight multi-purpose dams had been repeatedly hit,
simultaneously wrecking flood control, municipal and industrial water
storage, irrigation and hydroelectric power. Four of seven major
pumping stations were destroyed, as were 31 municipal water and
sewage facilities-20 in Baghdad, resulting in sewage pouring into the
Tigris. Water purification plants were incapacitated throughout
Iraq. 146
Defense Intelligence Agency documents drawn up in advance of the allied
attack, recently made public, show that the U.S. military studied the potential
effects of attacks on Iraq's water supply in great detail and was fully aware of
the likely impact of its impairment on civilians, including children. 147 One
report, entitled "Disease Information," under a heading "Subject: Effects of
Bombing on Disease Occurrence in Baghdad," states:
Increased incidence of diseases will be attributable to degradation of
normal preventive medicine, waste disposal, water purification/
distribution, electricity, and decreased ability to control disease
outbreaks. Any urban area in Iraq that has received infrastructure
damage will have similar problems.
The document proceeds to list likely epidemics, including E.coli, shigella,
salmonella, giardia, rotavirus, typhoid, and cholera, while noting, with respect
149
to several of these, the particular vulnerability of children.
The coalition destruction of the Iraqi water system represents a violation of
the requirements of discrimination and proportionality that were discussed
above. After interviewing U.S. military planners, a 1991 article in the
Washington Post concluded:

145.

See infra Section 11.E.

146.

Felicity Arbuthnot, Allies Deliberately Poisoned Iraq Public Water Supply in Gulf
Sept. 17, 2000, at 2.

War, SUNDAY HERALD,

147. Thomas J. Nagy, The Secret Behind the Sanctions, How the U.S. Intentionally
Destroyed Iraq's Water Supply, THE PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 2001, at 2225, available at http://
www.progressive.org/0801issue/nagyO9Ol.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).

148.

Id.

149.

Id.
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Many of the targets in Iraq's Mesopotamian heartland, the list of
which grew from about 400 to more than 700 in the course of the war,
were chosen only secondarily to contribute to the military defeat of
Baghdad's occupation army in Kuwait. Military planners hoped the
bombing would amplify the economic and psychological impact of
international sanctions on Iraqi society, and thereby compel President
Saddam Hussein to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait without a
ground war. They also hoped to incite Iraqi citizens to rise against the
150
Iraqi leader.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that coalition bombing, including some
of the heaviest against the city center of Baghdad, continuedfor two weeks after
a February 12, 1990 Pentagon statement declared: "Virtually
everything
15 1
militarily .. is either destroyed or combat ineffective."
The crippling of Iraq's water supply also violated Article 54 of the Geneva
Conventions, which prohibits attacks on objects indispensable to a civilian
population for any motive, explicitly including "drinking water installations and
supplies." 152 Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, under Article 85, are
to be treated as war crimes, 153 thus U.S. culpability seems glaringly apparent.
The callous indifference, bordering on racism, of U.S. policy-makers toward
Iraqi lives was epitomized when then-General Colin Powell responded to a
question regarding the number of Iraqi war casualties by saying: "It's really not
a number I'm terribly interested in." 154 Wartime damages to Iraq were severe
enough in themselves. Yet, their impact on the Iraqi people was multiplied by
both the pre- and post-war imposition of comprehensive multilateral sanctions,
amounting to a siege reminiscent of medieval times, which is the topic of the
next sub-section.

150.

Barton Gellman, Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials Acknowledge

Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military Targets, WASH. POST, June 23, 1991, Al, available at

http://www.scn.org/ccpi/WashPostWarDamage23Jun91 .html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
151.

BLUM, supra note 1,at 334.

152.

Protocol I, supranote 142. Article 54 stipulates:

It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render Useless objects indispensable to
the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking
water installations and supplies, and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of
denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse
party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to
move away, or for any other motive.
Id.
153.

Id.

154.

BLUM, supra note 30, at 69.
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F. Siege
The topic of sanctions against Iraq is lengthy and complex, and has
generated voluminous literature. 155 It is sufficient for our purposes here to make
several limited points. First, the post-war sanctions policy, while implemented
through the United Nations, is very much an American initiative and, like
Desert Storm, has been crafted to accomplish U.S. policy objectives. Second,
while sanctions led to the effective disarmament of Iraq, they have also caused
immense suffering amonf Iraqi civilians, leading to the deaths of as many as 1
to 2 million individuals. 1 56 Third, the targeting of innocent Iraqis is the modernday equivalent of a medieval siege, which violates a number of international
laws and treaties, arguably including the UN Convention on the Prevention and
157
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
We have already seen that comprehensive multilateral sanctions, barring
any exchange between Iraq and the outside world, except for the import to Iraq
of "humanitarian goods," were originally imposed to compel Iraq's withdrawal
from Kuwait. 158 The sanctions had already critically weakened Iraq by the
commencement of the Gulf War, multiplying the devastation caused by
159
coalition bombardment.
After Desert Storm, sanctions were re-imposed to force Iraqi compliance
with a lengthy, complex, and shifting set of demands, perhaps the most central
of which was submission to inspections for, and destruction of, weapons of
mass destruction, or WMD. 160 Post-war sanctions were largely a fruit of U.S.
and secondarily British diplomacy; a number of nations had favored
abandonment of sanctions at Iraq's acceptance of a cease-fire in April, 1991. In
the ensuing years, the U.S. has ceaselessly campaigned to maintain the strictest
sanctions enforcement possible against mounting international skepticism and
has acceded to minor amelioration in the sanctions regime only as a means to
rescue it from termination. 161

155. See generally, George E. Bisharat, International Sanctions Against Iraq: Where Are
We After Ten Years, II TRANSNAT'L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 379 (2001) (presenting a good
starting point); see generally, GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46 (providing superb detail and
analysis); and SIMONS, supra note 77, at 74 (providing superb detail and analysis).
156.

SIMONS, supra note 77, at 223.

157.

See infra this section.

158.

See supra Section I.E.

159. For example, as the Defense Intelligence Agency studies of the vulnerability of the
Iraqi water system noted, chlorine (used in water purification) was already in short supply in
January, 1991, due to the sanctions. Nagy, supra note 147; see also SIMONS, supra note 77, at 3473.
160.
note 101.

This was accomplished in UN Security Council Resolution 678. S.C. Res. 678, supra

161.

GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46, at 81. So, for example, the U.S. has steadfastly
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It has been evident virtually from the outset that U.S. goals for the
sanctions against Iraq exceeded even the compendium of those enunciated in
the cease fire agreement. Chief among U.S. demands was "regime change," for
which international consensus, let alone UN authorization, has never existed,
but was announced by high U.S. officials early on as the real objective of the
sanctions. 16 2 A more effective tool could hardly be imagined to dissuade the
Iraqi government from compliance with UN requirements than repeated
reminders that relief from sanctions would not be achieved anyway. Thus, the
international effort to disarm Iraq was consistently frustrated by the American
16 3
insistence on "regime change."
The weapons inspection program has also been undermined by Iraqi
suspicions, later confirmed, that the program was being used to gather
intelligence outside of the UN mandate. This intelligence was variously shared
with Iraq's enemy, Israel, used to direct aerial bombardments during subsequent
U.S.-British attacks on Iraq, and could have been employed in assassination
attempts on President Saddam Hussein. 164 Given stated U.S. intentions and its
support for several coup attempts during the 1990's, 165 there was no reason for
Hussein to not take such threats on his life seriously, which also66illuminates the
Iraqis' extreme sensitivity to inspections of presidential palaces.1
insisted that sanctions continue until all of the multitude of conditions of the cease fire be
punctiliously implemented, while other nations-notably France, Russia, and China have favored
gradual easing of restrictions to reward and encourage Iraqi compliance. Likewise, the U.S. has
repeatedly vetoed applications for imports of "dual use" goods to Iraq through the committee
established to oversee the flow of permitted goods into Iraq. Regarding one modification to ease the
acute humanitarian crisis in Iraq, Under Secretary of Sate Thomas Pickering expounded in 1998: "In
a very real sense, the Oil-for-Food program is the key to sustaining the sanctions regime until Iraq
complies with its wishes." GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46, at 83.

162. GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46, at 83. In April, 1991, barely two weeks following
the ceasefire, President Bush responded in a press conference: "Do I think the answer is now for
Saddam Hussein to be kicked out? Absolutely ... There will not be normalized relations with the
U.S. until Hussein is out of there. And we will continue economic sanctions." Id. at 64.
163. Eric Hoskins, The HumanitarianImpacts of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq, in
POLITICAL GAIN AND CIVILIAN PAIN 141 (Thomas Weiss et al. eds., 1997). The very complexity of
the demands in UN Resolution 678 also contributed to a "moving the goalposts" problem. Any
incremental Iraqi cooperation could be, and was, met with a shift in emphasis to some other term of
the cease fire agreement, thereby justifying retention of sanctions. Id.
164. Philip Shenon, Ex-Inspector Cites Early Role of C.I.A. on U.N. Arms Team, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999, at A6; William Arkin, The Difference was in the Details, WASH. POST, Jan.
19, 1999, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/imq/analysis.htm (last visited
Mar. 13, 2003).
165.

See infra Section II.F.

166. U.S. support for the Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein, including several coup
attempts, is discussed infra in Section II.F. Scott Ritter, a former U.S. Marine and member of the
UN weapons inspection team during the 1990's, describes an encounter with Iraqi security agents
that seemed, at first blush, to provide evidence of ongoing production of biological weapons. Upon
further investigation, it was revealed that the agents were part of a presidential security detail that
had biological antidotes for use in possible attempts on the life of Saddam Hussein. WILLIAM
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The U.S. call for "regime change" nonetheless masked an underlying
ambivalence in attitude toward Saddam Hussein, one that was manifest even
during the Gulf War. Coalition troops halted their advance well before reaching
Saddam's refuge in Baghdad. Even following President Bush's call for Iraqis
themselves to overthrow Hussein in the aftermath of Desert Storm, coalition
troops stood idle while the Iraqi military brutally crushed internal rebellions in
the Shi'a south and Kurdish north of the country. 167 The factor inhibiting
unrestrained U.S. pursuit of Hussein's demise was then, and still is, uncertainty
regarding "the day after." Fragmentation of Iraq as a state, and with it, the
prospect of a Shi'a majority-dominated Iraqi government that might be friendly
to Iran is a distinct, and unwelcome possibility. As some have noted,
Washington wanted a coup, not "regime change"-in short, replacement of
Saddam Hussein within an otherwise surviving governing structure. 168 As we
shall see below in Part G, the U.S. has intermittently attempted to bring about
this result through sponsorship of a number of coup attempts over the last
twelve years. 169
Through the same period, sanctions have been exploited by the U.S. to
maintain pressure on the Iraqi regime and contain it from aggressive exploits
without actually toppling it. This has amounted, as a matter of practice, to
keeping Iraq in the "weak and backward" state in which it was rendered by the
Gulf War. 170

Sanctions, particularly in a war-ravaged Iraq, were simply devastating to
the Iraqi people. Reports of immense civilian suffering due to sanctions began
to surface within months of the war, and have continued to the present.
Estimates of the numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths due to sanctions over the last

RIVERS PITT & SCOTT RITTER, WAR ON IRAQ, WHAT THE BUSH TEAM DOESN'T WANT YOU TO

KNOw 44-46 (2002). It was Ritter, too, who admitted that intelligence gathered by weapons
inspectors outside the UN mandate, including information on Saddam Hussein, was passed on to the
CIA and Israeli Mossad. Id.; see also Spying on Saddam: Interview of Scott Ritter, PBS FRONTLINE,

April 27, 1999, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/ritter.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
167. GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46, at 153-57. To dispel any illusions, the rebellions
themselves were also extremely brutal. In the south, Ba'ath party officials were dragged from their
offices and killed by rampaging mobs. Id. Loyalist Iraqi troops were alleged to have used chemical
weapons to suppress the uprisings, again, without comment from the United States. Davis, supra
note 5, at 275.
168.

GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46, at 62-64. This much was admitted by Richard Haas,

director for Middle East affairs of the National Security Council, when he said, to a staff director of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1991: "You don't understand. Our policy is to get rid of
Saddam, not his regime." COCKBURN, supra note 19 at 37-38.
169.

Infra Section II.G.

170. Supra, Section II.E. During the years of the Clinton presidencies, sanctions were part
of a broader strategy phrased as "dual containment" addressing both Iraq and Iran. GRAHAMBROWN, supra note 46 at 62-63,
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17 1
UN officials have recently
twelve years range as high as one to two million.
suggested that as many as five to six thousand Iraqi children die each month,
primarily due to sanctions. 172 The main cause of these grim figures appears to
both of which are attributable
be the synergy between malnutrition and disease,
173
to the degradation of the Iraqi infrastructure.

None of the various amendments to the sanctions regime have allowed Iraq
to rebuild its decrepit infrastructure, which is the real key to alleviating civilian
suffering. 174 Iraqi civilians, innocent of the misdeeds of their dictatorial
leadership, have suffered the brunt of the punishment. Their reliance on the
central government for food rations, and the emergence of a class of smugglers
and profiteers trading on ties to the state, have only increased the hold of the
Hussein regime over the Iraqi people.175
Iraq's record of resistance, evasion, and prevarication with respect to the
17 6
At the same
UN-administered weapons inspections program is undeniable.
time, through much perseverance, weapons inspectors succeeded in mostly
disabling Iraq's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Despite
lingering concerns over Iraq's stock of biological agents, in the words of former
weapons inspector Scott Ritter:
[B]y the time 1997 came around, Iraq had been qualitatively
disarmed. On any meaningful benchmark-in terms of defining Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction capability; in terms of assessing whether
or not Iraq posed a threat, not only to its immediate neighbors, but the
region and the world as a whole-Iraq had been eliminated as such a
threat. 177
Sanctions, no matter how effective, cannot be justified if, as a matter of
practice, they involve violations of international law. For example, it has been

171.

SIMONS, supra note 77, at 223.

172. UNICEF IRAQ CHILD AND MATERNAL MORTALITY SURVEYS (July 23, 2000) at
http://www.unicef.org.uk/news/lraql.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
173.

Hoskins, supra note 163, at 116.

174.

Voices in the Wilderness, Myths and Realities Regarding Iraq and Sanctions, in IRAQ

UNDER SIEGE 91-92 (Anthony Amove ed. 2002).

175. Hadani Ditmars, Iraqisfear it can only get worse; U.S. threats come after sanctions
ruinedeconomy, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 14, 2002; Hiro, supra note 33, at 5.
176.

See, e.g., Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, UNSCOM: Between Iraq and a Hard Place, 13

EUR. J. OF INT'L LAW 139, 141-42 (2002).

177. Scan Gonsalves, Scott Ritter on Iraq, CAPE COD TIMES, Mar. 7, 2000, at
http://www.commondreams.org/views/030700-106.htm. As to nuclear weapons, a U.S. official
overseeing operations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) commented: "The United
States pushes the IAEA to find little discrepancies in Iraq's nuclear accounting so the file can be
kept open, but short of lobotomizing or killing all the Iraqi nuclear scientists, the Iraqi nuclear
program is finished. We have closed down all their nuclear facilities and activities." Andrew
Cockburn, Should We Go to War Just Because We Can?, L. A.TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at R3.
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cogently argued that the sanctions violate the rights to life, health, education,
and an adequate standard of living enshrined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights. 178 Sanctions may violate special protections afforded children
in such instruments as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 179 Sanctions may also
violate provisions of the Geneva Conventions that bar the use of starvation
against civilian populations, and may constitute crimes against humanity under
the Nuremberg Principles. 180
This author has argued elsewhere that U.S. officials, together with others
responsible for prosecuting the sanctions program, may have committed
genocide against the people of Iraq under Article 2, subsections (a), (b), and (c)
of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide of
1948.181 There is prima facie evidence that they have, "with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national ... group ... as such," killed nationals of the state
of Iraq under Article 2(a); caused them "serious bodily or mental harm," under
2(b); and have deliberately inflicted on the Iraqi people "conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part," under
2(c).'82 Neither U.S. moral nor legal culpability is vitiated by the possibility
that the impact of sanctions has been exacerbated by actions of the Iraqi
regime. 183
Confrontations between UN weapons inspectors and Iraq over a variety of

178. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. I,
U.N. Doc. A/180 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
179. Roger Normand & Christoph Wilcke, Human Rights, Sanctions, and Terrorist
Threats: The United Nations Sanctions against Iraq, I I TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299,
339.
180. Michael Sklaire, The Security Council Blockade of Iraq.- Conflicting Obligations
under the United Nations Charter and the Fourth Geneva Convention, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
609 (1999); See generally, Erica Cosgrove, The Sanctions Dilemmna and the Case of Iraq: Human
Rights and Humanitarian Challenges to the Use of Multilateral Economic Sanctions, 9 WINDSOR
REV. OF LEG. & SOC. ISSUES 65, 72 (1999).

18 1. See generally, George E. Bisharat, Sanctions as Genocide, II TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 379 (2001). The article addresses in some detail the common objection (and
subject of a sustained propaganda campaign by U.S. government) that "Saddam Hussein is
responsible for his people's suffering." It also takes up the issue of intent, which is an element of the
crime of genocide also claimed to be absent in the case of Iraq sanctions. Cf Joy Gordon, When
Intent Makes All the Difference in the World: Economic Sanctions on Iraq and the Accusation of
Genocide, 5 YALE HuM.RTS. & DEV. L.J. 57.
182. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
183.

See generally, Bisharat, supra note I.
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technical aspects of the inspections came to a head in late 1998.184 Iraq
announced that it would suspend cooperation with the inspectors, who then
withdrew in advance of an intensive bombing campaign mounted by the U.S.
and Britain. 185 Iraq steadfastly refused to allow the return of the inspectors for
the ensuing four years.
Meanwhile,
sanctions were
continued, notwithstanding growing
reservations by many members of the international community about the
humanitarian impact of the sanctions and their dubious efficacy. By May, 2002,
support for continued sanctions was mustered by the U.S. only by introducing

further modifications to "smarten" them-that is, to target them more specifically
to "dual use" and purely military items, and to increase the flow of civilian

imports.186 However, "smart sanctions" have continued to impede
reconstruction of Iraq's steadily deteriorating infrastructure. In the view of
many, the sanctions were simply a failed policy maintained only through their
vigorous

promotion

by

the

U.S.,

and

secondarily,

Britain. 187

Weapons

inspections only resumed in Iraq after the passage of UN Security Council
Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002.188 That Resolution instituted a new,

tougher inspections process, demanding, among other things, that Iraq grant
inspectors unfettered access to all parts of the country and virtually everything

within it. 189 Inspections to date have turned up a small number of old empty
warheads that are apparently still in usable condition, 190 and rocket engines that
apparently exceed restrictions on Iraq's possession of ballistic missiles. 191 Iraq,

as required by the resolution, submitted a 12,000 plus page declaration

184. Naseer Aruri, America's War Against Iraq, 1991-1999, in IRAQ UNDER SIEGE 24
(Anthony Arnove ed.. 2002).
185.

Id.

186. The modifications were effected in UN Security Council Resolution 1254. S.C. Res.
1254, U.N. SCOR, 4028"h mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1254 (1999).
187. See generally Lutz Oette, A Decade of Sanctions Against Iraq: Never Again! The End
of Unlimited Sanctions in the Recent Practice of the UN Security Council, 13 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 93
(2002). From 1991 to 2000, the sanctions were structured such that they continued indefinitely, until
termination by resolution of the UN Security Council, thus conferring on each of the permanent
Council members a "reverse veto." Id. In 2000, however, time limits were introduced, so that the
sanctions would lapse after a period (either six or twelve months) unless renewed by the Security
Council. This forced the U.S. and Britain, the main-if not, by then, sole - proponents of sanctions to
have to periodically rally support for the program-a task that proved increasingly difficult. Id.
188.

S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 46441h mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).

189.

Id.

190. Iraqi Warhead Find Sets Off Dispute, CBS NEWS, Jan. 16, 2003, at http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/17/world/main536871 .shtml.
191. Edith M. Lederer, Experts to Judge Iraqi Missile Programs, CBS NEWS, Feb. 10,
2003, at http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2003/02/I0/23683-ap.html.
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presumably offering a full accounting of its WMD program. 192 Bush
administration officials have highlighted claimed omissions and falsehoods in
the Iraqi declaration, construing them as ongoing Iraqi deception and resistance
to the disarmament and as "material breaches" of Iraq's obligations under
UNSCR 1441.193
G. Covert Actions - "Not Missionary Work" 194
We have already seen that the U.S. has a legacy of intervention in the
internal political affairs of Iraq that dates back at least to the 1960's, including
support for two Ba'ath coups, aid to the Kurdish separatist movement in the
early to mid-1970's, and incitement of rebellions in the north and south of Iraq
in the direct aftermath of the Gulf War. 195 All such interventions violate the
fundamental international legal principle of respect for sovereignty embodied at
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which holds that: "Nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which
196
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
The composition of the government of a nation state is quintessentially a
matter of domestic jurisdiction. Sovereignty of a member nation of the UN may
be breached only via a UN authorization of an enforcement action to protect
international peace and security. 197 A nation's sovereignty is not compromised
by the misdeeds of its leaders, unless such misdeeds lead to UN authorized
intervention. Assassination of a head of state is both a violation of that state's
sovereignty and of the individual leader's right to life.
The U.S. has added to its record of illegal interventions in Iraq repeatedly
in recent years, pursuant to a presidential finding signed by the first President
George Bush in May, 1991, authorizing covert actions to overthrow Saddam
Hussein, including assassination. 198 Over the ensuing five years, the CIA

192.

John F. Bums, A Top Iraqi Aide Defies U.S. to Find Proofof Weapons, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 9, 2002, at http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/030104inspectiraq.html#41 (last visited Mar. 13,
2003).
193.

See, e.g., Condoleezza Rice, Why We Know Iraq is Lying, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2003,

at A25.
194.

BLUM, supra note I, at 242. Henry Kissinger, defending U.S. betrayal of the Kurds in

1975, commented that "Covert action is not missionary work." Id.
195.

R. Jeffrey Smith & David B. Ottaway, Anti-Saddan Operation Cost CIA $100 million,

Sept. 15, 1996, at AI.The incitement was primarily verbal, in the form of President
Bush's public invitation that the people of Iraq "take matters into their own hands." Id. But the U.S.
WASH. POST,

also moved troops as if to support the rebellions, before the decision crystallized not to intervene.

Id.
196.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.

197.

U.N. CHARTER art. 42.

198.

Smith & Ottaway, supra note 195, at Al.
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disbursed approximately $20 million annually to a variety of Iraqi opponents of
the Hussein regime who bought arms, communications gear, publishing
materials, broadcast equipment, and other materiel to be used in killing or
otherwise ousting Saddam Hussein. 19 9 At least two major initiatives, one
launched by the Iraqi National Congress (1NC) in 1995 and the other led by the
Iraqi National Accord (INA) in 1996, were foiled with ease by a combination of
the military and Saddam Hussein's ruthlessly efficient security service.
Numerous lesser attempts were equally futile. 2 0 While failing in their goals,
the coup attempts led directly to hundreds of deaths of both rebels and loyalists,
and a further ratcheting up of Saddam Hussein's repression. 2 0 1 The INA has
killed over 100 Iraqi civilians in a campaign of terror, employing car bombs
2 °2
among other things as a means of destabilizing the Iraqi regime.
In truth, Washington's commitment to Saddam Hussein's Iraqi opponents
has always been equivocal. Doubtlessly this stems mainly from distrust in their
capabilities and preference for an Iraq under Saddam Hussein over an
incompetent leadership that might fall prey to the influences of Iran. 2 03 As to
the Kurdish-based opposition in the north of Iraq, the U.S. has never endorsed
its ultimate objective of national autonomy, largely out of deference to regional
ally Turkey. Since Turkey has the largest Kurdish population, it is the country
that stands to lose the most when dreams of Kurdish independence are
20 4
stoked.
Until the administration of the younger George Bush, the most vociferous
support for the Iraqi opposition has typically come from Republican members
of Congress, rather than from the administration. 2 05 In 1998, this led to passage
of the Iraq Liberation Act, which earmarked $97 million for Iraqi opposition
efforts to overthrow the government of another sovereign nation in violation of
international law. 206 Still, the Clinton administration dragged its heels in

199.

Id.

200. Randy Steams, The CIA's Secret War in Iraq, DEFENCE J., Oct. 1998, at
http://www.defencejoumal.com/oct98/ciasecretwar.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
201.
Id.; see also GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 46 at 116-17. The INC coup attempt
originated in parts of the Kurdish areas of the north deemed a "protected zone" that remained
outside of Iraqi central government control after the Gulf War. Establishment and enforcement of
these zones will be taken up in the next sub-section, II.H

202.

BLUM, supra note 30, at 154.

203.

Id.

204. Smith & Ottaway, supra note 195, at Al. These concerns led the U.S. to decline to
arm the Kurds of Iraq with weaponry that might later be turned against Turkey. Id.
205. GRAHAM-BROWN & TOENSING, supra note 36, at 64. Republican members of the
Senate Intelligence Committee were apparently at the forefront in urging "a more 'proactive'
strategy against the Iraqi regime." Id.

206. Iraq
Liberation
Act
of
1998,
Pub.
L. No.
http://www.fcnl.org/issues/int/sup/iraqliberation.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
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disbursing the funds, reflecting its dim assessment of the efficacy of the INC
and other opposition groups.
The second Bush administration has steadily ramped up its promotion of
the Iraqi opposition over the last year, as a necessary part of the broader
campaign to rationalize war against Iraq. President Bush signed a directive on
October 3, 2002, to begin military and sabotage training to Iraqi exiles, as part
of a "war before the war" intended to destabilize the Iraqi regime. 208 Special
presidential envoy Zalmay Khalilzad attended the "Iraqi Opposition
Conference" in London in December 2002.209 Three hundred individuals
representing fifty-seven parties and organizations were present at the U.S.sponsored and organized event. 2 10 Although a political statement was agreed
upon, the conference was plagued by boycotts, a walkout, and highlighted rifts
along political, religious, and ethnic lines. Ongoing disagreements among the
groups caused indefinite postponement of a follow-up meeting originally slated
11
to be held on Iraqi soil on January 15, 2003. 2 Although support for organizing
lawful and peaceful opposition groups does not violate international law, U.S.
support for armed insurrection, and terrorism, as we have seen above, clearly
violates Iraqi sovereignty. It also violates a variety of other international treaties
Suppression of
and principles, including the International Convention for 2the
12
Terrorist Bombings, signed and ratified by the United States.
H. The War Already Underway
Since the Gulf War, the U.S. and Great Britain have enforced northern and
southern "no fly zones" in Iraq, from which Iraqi fixed wing aircraft, and in
some circumstances, helicopters, have been banned. 2 13 The no fly zones have
been enforced by increasingly aggressive actions by the U.S. and Great Britain,
including numerous air attacks that have resulted in both military and civilian

207. GRAHAM-BROWN & TOENSING, supra note 36, at 11. Only $8 million of the total
allocation was actually disbursed before Clinton left office in January, 2001. Id.
208. Elliot & Michael Massimo Calabresi, Inside the Secret Campaign to Topple Saddam,
TIME, Dec. 2, 2002, at 34-35.
209.

Id.

210.

Id.

211.

Shravanti Reddy, Iraqi opposition groups postpone meeting, DIGITAL FREEDOM

NETWORK, Jan. 8, 2003, a, http://www.dfn.org/news/iraq/opposition.htm
2003).

(last visited Jan. 21,

212. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997,
99-2 C.T.I.A. 983.
213.

SARAH GRAHAM-BROWN, MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH AND INFORMATION PROJECT, No-

FLY ZONES: RHETORIC AND REAL INTENTIONS, (Feb. 20, 2001), at http://www.globalpolicy.org/

security/issues/iraq/2001/0220nofl.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
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deaths. 2 14 A quarter of a million sorties were flown within the first nine years of
the no fly zones. 2 15 Although figures are difficult to confirm, Iraq claimed that
between December 1998 and early 2001, 323 civilians were killed in no-fly
zone bombings, and another 960 were injured. 2 16 Borne of an already
questionable legal pedigree, the no-fly zones have evolved away from their
original function to such an extent that a credible argument for their legality
cannot be sustained. On the contrary, the zones, and military operations to
support them, constitute violations of Iraqi sovereignty
and acts of aggression
2 17
respectively, both in violation of the UN Charter.
The first no-fly zone was established in northern Iraq in the aftermath of
the Gulf War. 2 18 Iraqi troops, re-establishing central government control over
Kurdish areas then in revolt, drove thousands of Kurds into flight into
mountains along the Turkish border. 2 19 Pressure mounted on coalition forces to
respond, and on April 1991, "Operation Provide Comfort" was announced by
President Bush. 220 A ban on Iraqi flights north of the 36th parallel was imposed
in order to protect both air drops of aid to Kurdish refugees and coalition
ground forces entering Iraq from Turkey. France and Britain joined the U.S. in
patrolling the no-fly zone. 22
While coalition ground forces eventually withdrew, the northern no-fly
zone was maintained, purportedly to shield the Kurds and the international aid
workers who had arrived to help them. 222 The Iraqi government responded by
withdrawing government services from its three northern governates and has
not returned them to this day. 223 Instead, the 224
areas have been self-administered
by the Kurds in a kind of informal autonomy.
The second no-fly zone was instituted in an area below the 32nd parallel in

214.

Id.

215. Thomas E. Ricks, Containing Iraq: a Forgotten War, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2000, at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/2000/1025nfly.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
216. GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 213. In one such incident on May 12, 1999, an American
F-15E launched a 3,000-pound bomb into a shepherd's camp after intelligence analysts mistook a
metal tank that was used for watering sheep for a surface-to-air missile launcher. Ricks, supra note
215. F-16 pilots then strafed surrounding tents, taking them for camouflaged military facilities. As
many as nineteen were killed and forty-six wounded. Id.
217.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2.

218.

GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 213.

219.

Id.

220.

Id.

221.

Id.

222.

Id.

223.

GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 213.

224.

Id.
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August, 1992, in response to Iraq's campaign to quell a rebellion originating in
the marsh areas of southern Iraq. 225 Ground troops were never committed,
however, and the Iraqi military effort in the south continued with the use of
tanks and artillery. 226 Hence, protection of the residents of the marsh regions
22 7
was never effected.
Over time, the functions and rationales for the two zones began to stray
into bein part of a broader strategy to "keep up the pressure on Saddam
Hussein."1 2 The northern zone became the staging ground for several
229
unsuccessful coup attempts, supported by an on-site crew from the CIA.
Neither function bore much relationship to protection of local populations,
which was the claimed legal basis for the original imposition of the zones.
Recognizing the changed circumstances, France pulled out of enforcement of
the southern zone in 1996 and the northern zone in 1998, leaving the U.S. and
Britain to continue alone. 23 The integrity of the humanitarian mission of the
zones has been shaken by U.S. and British tolerance of major ground and air
incursions into the northern zone against the Kurds by Turkey in 1995 and
2000.231
Together, the two zones prohibit Iraqi flights in a majority of that country's
sovereign airspace and permit the movement of enemy aircrafts there at will.
Legal authority for these actions was claimed under UN Security Council
Resolution 688, which had condemned Iraqi "repression of the Iraqi civilian
population," and deemed it a "threat to international peace and security."' 232 Yet
the resolution made no explicit reference to any kind of enforcement action, and
was not undertaken pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, under which
such enforcement actions are authorized. 233 No countries other than the original
225.

Id.

226.

Id.

227. The Killing of Iraq's Ancient Marsh Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, at sec. 4
(describing the terrible effects of the Iraqi campaign in the south).
228.

GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 213.

229.

Id.; The coup attempts were described in the previous section, supra II.G.

230.

GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 213.

231. Id.; see also Ricks, supra note 215; John Pilger, The Secret War: Iraq War Already
Under Way, THE MIRROR, Dec. 20, 2002, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/
iraq/nofly/2002/1220secret.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
232.

S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 2982d mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/0688 (1991).

233. Id. The resolution, drafted by France, was influenced by then-ascendant theories of
"humanitarian intervention"- that is, that sovereignty could be legally breached by outside powers
acting to protect a civilian population from gross violations of their human rights at the hands of
their own government. See generally, Constantine Antonopoulos, The Unilateral Use of Force by
States After the End of the Cold War, 4 J. OF ARMED CONFLICT L. 117 (1999). The legality of
humanitarian intervention is generally in doubt, however, and the U.S. has argued that the no-fly
zones were necessary to enforce UNSCR 688 in the face of material breach by Iraq. Id.
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three subscribed
to this claim, and the French have since voted on the matter
234
with their feet.
The U.S. and its partners have further claimed the right to use force in
"self-defense" against any Iraqi attacks on their aircrafts that are patrolling the
two zones. 235 But the no-fly zones in themselves lack any grounding in
international law, which is all the more so with the drift away from their
original justification. 236 They are simply illegal. It follows, as well, that Iraq is
legally entitled to use force to defend its sovereign airspace from intrusion by
enemy aircraft.
The steady, low intensity warfare waged by the U.S. and others against
Iraq through imposition and enforcement of the no-fly zones has been
punctuated by a number of attacks of much higher intensity, both within and
outside of the zones themselves. Thus, in 1993, President Clinton ordered the
Iraqi military intelligence headquarters in Baghdad to be bombed with Cruise
missiles in retaliation for an alleged attempt to assassinate former President
Bush during his visit to Kuwait. World-renowned Iraqi painter Leila al-Attar
was killed in this attack, which was unjustified by the principles of self-defense
or any other international law. 237 In 1996, the U.S. responded to an Iraqi
military incursion into the northern zone, at the invitation of one Kurdish
faction, seeking to gain leverage over the other, by stepping up bombing in the
23 8
south.
By far the largest of these attacks occurred in December-January, 1998,
when the U.S. and British responded to the departure of weapons inspectors,
and the refusal by Iraq to readmit them, by launching "Operation Desert Fox."
The bombardment commenced while the UN Security Council was still
considering the report of the weapons inspectors, and was done without its
authorization. 239 The two allies claimed an ongoing right to use force to compel
Iraqi compliance with the terms of the Gulf War cease-fire agreement,
stemming from the original "by any means necessary" resolution, UNSCR
678. 240 U.S and British officials also cited UN Security Council Resolution
1205, passed on November 8, 1998, that condemned Iraqi non-cooperation with

234.

GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 213.

235.

Silliman, supra note 117, at 770.

236.

Id.

237. Antonopoulos, supra note 233, at 130-32; see also Christine Gray, After the Ceasefire:
Iraq, the Security Council, and the Use of Force, 65 THE BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 135, 171 (1994).
238. Simultaneously, the U.S. announced an expansion of the southern no fly zone up to the
33rd parallel.
239. Antonopoulos, supra note 233; see also David Kreiger, Military Action Against Iraq
Violates International Law, at http://128.242.103.136/-resisftp/resistance/enanalyse/iq l .htm (last
visited Jan. 21,2003).
240.

Antonopoulos, supra note 233, at 154.
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24 1

weapons inspectors as a violation of the cease fire terms.
Operation Desert Fox specifically targeted Saddam Hussein and high-level
government officials in what was tantamount to an "aerial assassination"
attempt. 24 2 Almost half of the 100 targets in the four-day attack-which
exceeded the Desert Storm bombing in intensity-were gathering points for the
Iraqi leadership, including Saddam Hussein's sleeping quarters in Baghdad.
Moreover, these sites were identified in part with information gathered through
24 3
the UN weapons inspection program.
The purported legal basis for Desert Fox was roundly criticized, both
within the United Nations, whose authority had been bypassed and thereby
undermined, and outside of it. 244 Of the unilateral use of force to enforce UN
resolutions on Iraq, eminent international legal scholar Professor Thomas
Franck opined:
In my opinion, by any normal construction drawn from administrative
law of any legal system, what the Security Council has done is occupy
the field ... After all these actions, to now state that the United
Nations has not in fact occupied the field, that there remains under
Article 51 [affirming a nation's right to self-defense] or under
Resolution 678, which authorized the initial use of force, which
authorization was terminated in Resolution 687, a collateral total
freedom on the part of any UN member to use military force against
Iraq at any point that any member considers there to have been a
violation of the conditions set forth in Resolution 678, is to make a
24 5
complete mockery of the entire system.
Following Operation Desert Fox, rules of engagement for the no-fly zones were
expanded such that U.S. and British pilots could strike the Iraqi air defense
system either when it fired on them or "locked on" radar detectors. 246 During
February 2001, in the first month of the new Bush administration, Iraqi antiaircraft fire triggered another intensified U.S. bombing attack encompassing

241.

Id.

242. William Arkin, The Difference was in the Details, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1999, at BI,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/analysis.htm (last visited
Jan. 21, 2003).
243.

Id.

244.

Antonopoulos, supra note 233, at 155.

245. Thomas Franck, 92 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 1136, 1139 (1998); see also Jules Lobel
& Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Ceasefires, and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., Jan. 1999, at
http://www.asil.org/ajil/Iobel.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003); see generally, Christine Gray, From
Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force Against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1,
15(2002).
246.

GRAHAM-BROWN, supra note 213.
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247

targets outside the no-fly zones.
Recent months have witnessed a dramatic escalation of confrontations
within the no-fly zones. 248 In'the five months preceding January 15, 2003,
American and British warplanes have bombed eighty targets. 249 Under
authorization from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. jets are now
attacking air defense communications centers. 250 Military planners
acknowledge that the purpose of expanding the range of targets is to degrade the
Iraqi air defense system in advance of an impending invasion by U.S. air and
ground forces. 25 1 Meanwhile, Washington has begun to argue that Iraqi firing
upon British and American aircraft in the no-fly zones constitutes a "material
breach" of UN Security Council252resolutions, which is a pretext that is likely to
be cited for any upcoming war.
The escalation of military conflict in the no-fly zones has corresponded
with a steadily intensifying bellicose rhetoric emanating from Washington. For
more than a year, U.S. officials have repeatedly threatened war against Iraq,
often expressing willingness of the United States to "go it alone" if necessary,
that is, to attack Iraq without UN authorization, and thus in violation of
international law. These threats themselves constitute violations of the UN
Charter, which in Article 2(4) counsels: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
253
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
To recapitulate this lengthy review of U.S. policy toward Iraq: first, we
fostered Saddam Hussein's rise to power, knowing he was a murderous thug.
We helped him consolidate his regime and expand and arm his military,
including WMD. We unleashed him against Iran, encouraging an eight-year
blood bath that wasted the lives of hundreds of thousands of young Iraqi and
Iranian soldiers, as well as Iraqi Kurdish civilians. When our minion gained too
much power and independence, we visited massive destruction on the entire
country and the people of Iraq during the Gulf War. We followed up with
ruinous sanctions, repeated assassination and coup attempts, continuous aerial

247.

Id.

248. Vernon Loeb, Air Strikes in Southern No Fly Zone Mount, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2003,
at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/nofly/2003/0115airstrikes.htm (last visited Jan.
21, 2003).

249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Stephen Zunes, The Abuse of the No-Fly Zones as an Excuse for War,FOREIGN POL'Y
IN Focus, Dec. 6, 2002, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/nofly/2002/
1206excuse.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).

253.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2,para. 4.
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bombardment, terrorism, and threats of force. The entire record is replete with
numerous, grave violations of international law.
We should meditate, just briefly, on what it would have been like to be on
the receiving end of this intense and destructive interest on the part of the U.S.
government. In a very real sense, we have waged an illegal war against Iraq for
the past twelve years. 2 54 Another hammer blow awaits. It is to that possibility
we now turn.
Ill. THE COMING WAR
A. Why war?
Why are we on the verge of war with Iraq? This is a momentous question,
even if in view of our twelve-year campaign against Iraq. An invasion would
only constitute a quantitative,rather than qualitative, shift in our relations with
that country. The most obvious starting point for answering this question is the
Bush administration's stated political and legal reasons for waging a war against
Iraq. Because these will prove ultimately unsatisfactory, we must look
elsewhere, particularly at the "oil factor" and at the neoconservative ideology
with its special solicitude for Israel that is now dominant at senior levels of the
American government, especially in the Department of Defense. Following that,
we will look at some of the likely costs of war, including human and economic
costs, dangers of regional destabilization, increased terrorism, damage to
international law and institutions, and harm to U.S. moral, legal, and political
standing in the world community.
B. The Stated Motivationsfor War
Divining the Bush administration's genuine motivations for attacking Iraq
has not been easy. In a manner strongly reminiscent of his father twelve years
before, the younger President George Bush and his deputies have deployed a
revolving set of rationales for war. 2 55 Skepticism regarding the necessity of
military action against Iraq has been fueled by the administration's insistence
that a diplomatic approach would be feasible in the
broadly parallel dispute over
256
North Korea's drive to develop nuclear weapons.

254.

Pilger, supra note 231.

255. Michael McFaul states that: "Since Sept. 11, nation-building is ascendant again in
White House, dueling ideologies make justifications for war unclear" Michael McFaul, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 19, 2003, at http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/editorial/
4983375.htm (last visited Jan 27, 2003); see BLUM, supra note 1,329-33 (discussing the revolving
justifications for the Gulf War).
256.

Patrick Carkin, Hidden Casualties and Secret Diplomacy: the History of US Relations
North
Korea,
COMMON
DREAMS,
Jan.
2,
2003,
at
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0102-05.htm; Col. Dan Smith (Ret.), Iraq, North Korea,
with
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Nonetheless, the U.S. stated justification for an invasion of Iraq can be
distilled into the following: the regime of Saddam Hussein is a threat to the
security of the United States and to the international community. Saddam
Hussein has repeatedly resisted UN resolutions designed to disarm Iraq of
WMD and an invasion is necessary to replace his regime with a non-aggressive,
democratic government. In support of this proposition, Saddam Hussein has
invaded two neighbors, Iran and Kuwait. He has gassed and brutally repressed
his own population. He continues to assiduously amass weapons of mass
destruction for threat or use against his neighbors and the U.S., possibly through
a terrorist intermediary. His support for, and connections to, "terror" is further
proof of the threat that he represents. Let us review the arguments that the Iraqi
government is presently so dangerous to us that it must be overthrown.
Saddam Hussein has twice invaded neighboring countries, Iran and
Kuwait.2 57 Putting aside for the moment that the Iran invasion was at the urging
and support of the U.S., do the past invasions show that Saddam Hussein is a
compulsive "serial aggressor," likely to strike again against the U.S. or one of
Iraq's neighbors? Perhaps, but as we have seen in Section II, neither the Iran nor
the Kuwait invasion was without provocation. 2 58 Both were undertaken in a
calculated, if ruthless, fashion and under circumstances in which Hussein had
25 9
reason to expect gain.
Saddam Hussein is unscrupulous, cruel, and willing to use force to achieve
advantage. But there is little evidence to indicate that he is simply an
uncontrolled addict of violence. 260 Furthermore, his military has been reduced
to a shadow of its former self - by some estimates, it currently enjoys but one
third its power at the time of the Gulf War, when it was easily trounced by
coalition forces. 26 1 This is likely the best explanation for the fact that Hussein
has not committed an act of aggression for the last twelve years and that he can
continue to be contained in the right set of circumstances. This is also why none

and the US Nuclear "...Or Else", FOREIGN POL'Y IN Focus,
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/commentary/2003/0301 nkiraq.html.

Jan.

13,

2003,

at

257. Supra Section II.E.
It is sometimes added that Iraq also aggressed against two other
countries - Israel and Saudi Arabia - by firing missiles on them during the Gulf War. Marshall,
Making the Case for Iraq, supra note 84. The Scud missile attacks were launched against Saudi
Arabia when it served as a base for coalition troops involved in fighting against Iraq, and should be
properly considered an extension of that battle. The missile attacks on Israel, meanwhile, were
essentially a ploy to put political pressure on Arab and other Gulf War coalition members by
symbolically allying them with Israel. Iraq had not attacked Israel before (other than in 1948, under
an entirely different government and regional alignment of power), nor has it since.
258.

Supra Section I1.
This is not, to be sure, the same asjustification.

259.

Mearshimer & Walt, supra note 40.

260.

Id.

261. Stephen Zunes, Why Not to Wage War Against Iraq, FOREIGN POL'Y IN Focus, Aug.
2, 2002, at http://www.fpif.org (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
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262
of the countries immediately surrounding Iraq favor an attack at this time.
Saddam Hussein, or his generals, ordered the use of gas in the war against
Iran and in suppressing internal rebellion. Again, none of this deterred U.S.
policy makers from supporting Iraq at the time. Apparently they had no
expectation that Iraq would use these fearsome weapons, except against people
to whose suffering they were indifferent. Will he now use these or other WMD
against the United States? He presumably had such an opportunity during the
Gulf War and declined. Wisely, one would think, for one would be hard pressed
to find a better guarantee of nuclear incineration. Neither were WMD used in
the missile strikes against Israel-another nuclear power. 263 The fact is that the
Iraqis have used WMD only against weaker foes, or ones who did not possess
the same weapons. Nothing in Saddam Hussein's bloody history suggests that
he is irrationally suicidal. The conclusion: Iraq can be deterred from aggression
by threat of equal or superior force. 264 Only Hussein's imminent demise is
likely to trigger his use of WMD, in the estimable judgment of CIA Director
George Tenet; 265 so an American invasion may catalyze the very apocalypse it
seeks to prevent.
Saddam Hussein is rebuilding his stockpile of WMD. UN inspectors have
been scouring Iraq for evidence of WMD since their return to that country in
late November, 2002. To date, the inspectors have found no significant
evidence of an illegal weapons program, with the arguable exception of ballistic
missiles that slightly exceed UN-mandated restrictions. 266 In the estimation of
Daniel Richardson, editor of the respected journal, Jane's Missiles and Rockets,
the violation was equivalent to "driving 36 mph in a 30 mph limit." 267 In fact,
many of the processes involved in production and testing of weapons and
weapons delivery systems are detectable by remote satellite and other
sophisticated technology. 268 No convincing evidence has been shared with an
American and world public clearly primed to receive it, including during
Secretary of State Colin Powell's February 5, 2003 presentation to the Security

262.

Id.

263.

Mearshimer & Walt, supra note 40. On Israel's nuclear capacity, see generally

SEYMOUR HERSH, THE SAMSON OPTION: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND AMERICAN FOREIGN

POLICY (1991).

264.

Mearshimer & Walt, supra note 40.

265. Paul Reynolds, CIA Undermines Propaganda War, BBC NEWS, Oct. 10, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/Iow/world/americas/2315967.stm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).

266.
Jan. 2003.
267.

See generally, Howard Friehl, Evidence and Iraq, WORLD EDITORIAL AND INT'L L.,
Blair: Weapons Report' Breachs UN Resolution,' THE

GUARDIAN,

Feb. 13, 2003, at

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,894628,00.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
268.

Rivers & Pitt, supra note 166, at 37.
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Council. 269 Moreover, the presence of UN weapons inspectors obviously
complicates any plans Saddam Hussein might foster to rebuild WMD. Finally,
even if Saddam Hussein now possessed
WMD, it would be, as we have seen
2 70
above, suicidal for him to use them.
The Hussein regime has supported terror. It is true that Iraq harbored the
infamous Abu Nidal until his death in August, 2002, although his active
involvement in terror ended years ago. 27 1 It is also the case that Saddam
Hussein has ordered payment to families of Palestinians killed by Israeli troops
in the al-Aksa Intifada (not simply to families of "suicide bombers", as is often
reported). 2 72 But the claimed meeting between Iraqi agents and al-Qa'eda
273
operative and 9/11 perpetrator Mohammed Atta in Prague proved to be false.
There is little in Saddam Hussein's history-as we have seen, replete with vicious
repression of Islamist movements in Iraq, and enmity returned in kind-that
would make an alliance with al-Qa'eda likely. 274 If a marriage of convenience
were nonetheless negotiated, Hussein would be loath to share WMD with
Islamist terrorists. Not only would he lose control over targeting and timing of
the weapons' use, his address would be written all over 275
them, inviting near
certain lethal reprisal from the U.S. in the event of their use.
The arguments and evidence hardly seem compelling. Putting that aside for
the moment, however, what is the legal framework within which the U.S. seeks
to advance its aims? What are the justifications in law for war against Iraq?
C. The U.S. Legal Position
As we know, there are two ways that member nations of the UN may

269.

Linda Heard, General Powell at the UN: Spiel, Stunts, and Special Effects,
Feb. 6, 2003, at http://www.counterpunch.org/heard02062003.html (last visited
Mar. 13, 2003).

COUNTERPUNCH,

270. Maershimer & Walt, supra note 40; see also Fareed Mohamedi & Raad Alkadiri,
Washington Makes its Case for War, MIDDLE EAST REP. 224 (Fall 2002), at
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer224/224_mohamedi_alkadiri.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
271. US Welcomes News of Abu Nidal's Death, CNN, Aug. 19, 2002, at http://
www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/08/19/mideast.nidal/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). The last
reported instance of Iraqi involvement in international terror was in 1993, in the alleged plot to
assassinate ex-President George Bush during his visit to Kuwait. Zunes, supra note 261, at 2.
272.

HIRO, supra note 33, at 190-91.

273. James Risen, Prague Discounts an Iraqi Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2002, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/l0/2l/intemational/21PRAG.htmI (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
274. Robert Collier, Bush's Evidence of Threat Disputed, Findings Often Ambiguous,
Contradict CIA,
S.F.
CHRON.,
Oct.
12,
2002,
at http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2002/10/12/MN186933.DTL (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
275. Mearshimer & Walt, supra note 40. This same conclusion was reached by the Gilmore
Commission, appointed by President Clinton following the bombings against the U.S. embassies in
East Africa, in its 1999 report. HIRO, supra note 33, at 243.
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lawfully employ force: first, the UN Security Council identifies a threat to

international peace and security and authorizes military action to eliminate that
threat pursuant to Article 42 of the UN Charter. 2 76 Second, a nation may use
force under the UN Charter when acting in self-defense against an armed attack
under Article 5 1. 277 The U.S. has tried to stake out arguments in support of an
invasion of Iraq on both grounds. According to the U.S., Iraq stands in material
breach of as many as sixteen UN Security Council resolutions and, other
avenues having been exhausted, force is now justified to compel Iraqi
27 8
compliance.
Of course, it is indisputable that the U.S. and its dutiful ally Great Britain,
have not yet received explicit authorization from the Security Council to attack
Iraq for this or any other purpose. The latest Security Council resolution on the
Iraq dispute, UNSCR 1441, 279 contains no such wording. Moreover, it was
passed amidst numerous public statements by the U.S. and other permanent
members of the Security Council that the resolution lacked "automaticity." That
is to say, breach of its provisions could not serve automatically to authorize the
use of force by a member nation. 28 Instead, some further action by the Security
Council will be necessary before force may be lawfully employed.
Here, however, ambiguity and disagreement arise. The resolution does not
explicitly state what action the Security Council must take in the event that Iraq
is found in material breach of UNSCR 1441 or earlier resolutions. 2 8 1 The U.S.
has pledged to abide by UNSCR 144 I's requirement that the matter be returned
to the Security Council for "discussion," but has also maintained that a new
resolution bearing explicit authorization for force is unnecessary. 282 In the
event that Iraq is in "material breach" of either UNSCR 1441 or other pertinent
UN resolutions, a condition the U.S. maintains has already occurred, 283 then
implicit authorization to use force, stemming from earlier resolutions, is
sufficient.
This, it will be recalled, echoes the position taken by the United States in

276.

U.N. CHARTER art. 42.

277.

U.N.

CHARTER art.

51.

278.
THE WHITE HOUSE, HUSSEIN'S DEFIANCE OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/decade/sect2.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
279.

S.C. Res. 144 1,supra note 188.

280. David Krieger & Devon Chafee, Law Triumphs over Force: For the Moment, in THE
IRAQ CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (Richard Falk & David Krieger, eds, 2003).
281.

PHYLLIS BENNIS, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, U.S. AT THE SECURITY

COUNCIL (2002), at http://www.afsc.org/iraq/guide/unanalysis.shtm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003)..
282.

id.

283.

See Rice, supra note 193, at A25.
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1998 in with respect to its attack on Iraq during Desert Fox.284 At that time, the
U.S. harked back to the original "all necessary means" resolution (UNSCR 678)
for justification in launching attacks six years later in response to Iraqi noncooperation with weapons inspections. 285 The claim was weak then and is even
weaker now with the emergence of a stronger international consensus against
unilateral exercises of force to implement UN resolutions in recent years, in
2 86
Moreover, the
part, in reaction to the U.S. actions during Desert Fox.
American position is impossible to square with repeated statements by France
and other Security Council members that no implicit authorization of force was
intended in UNSCR 1441.287
The U.S. has also stated its view that UNSCR 1441 does not limit its
288
That would
inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
bound
to
uphold the
Council
is
Security
as
the
in
the
abstract;
seem unassailable
UN Charter, it is in no position to abrogate by resolution a principle enshrined
in the Charter. Yet, not constraining legitimate self-defense is not tantamount to
authorizing the unilateral use of force. Unless the conditions for legitimate selfdefense exist-that is, the U.S. and/or its allies have been attacked by Iraq or
perhaps face a threat of attack so imminent that the matter cannot be brought
before the Security Council, then this argument seems unavailing as well.
Clearly, no attack by Iraq has occurred yet, and no one, at this point, has
claimed that such an attack is truly imminent.
To boot, the Security Council has assumed oversight of the situation,
2 89
and is managing
"occupied the field," to recall Professor Franck's language,
the dispute through the current weapons inspections. It is hard to conjure a legal
justification for unilateral use of force until, at a minimum, the weapons
inspection process has been played out unsuccessfully and no other alternatives
exist to resolve the dispute pacifically.
Likely recognizing the inapplicability of the right to self-defense in its
classic formulation to its face-off with Iraq, the Bush administration has
attempted to strike new legal ground for an attack on Iraq in announcing what it
calls a doctrine of "preemption." 290 In fact, this term is misleading as it implies

284.

See supra Section II.H.

285.

Id.

286. Christine Gray, From Unity to Polarization:InternationalLaw and the Use of Force
Against Iraq 13 EUR. J. INT'L LAW 1 (2002); see also Niels Blokker, Is the Authorisation
Authorised? Powers and Practices of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by
'Coalitionsof the Able and Willing,' II EUR. J.INT'L LAW 541 (2000).
287. Phyllis Bennis, Resolution 1441: Washington Strong-Arms the Security Council, in
THE IRAQ CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (Richard Falk & David Krieger eds., 2003).
288.

Id.

289.

See supra text accompanying note 245.

290.

Anthony Dworkin, Iraq and the "Bush Doctrine" of PreemptiveSelf-Defence, CRIMES
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an attack in the shadow of an imminent and unavoidable threat from another. In
fact, the real logic underlying the doctrine is to strike now because the threat,
while distant, may be harder to eliminate in the future. Some have dubbed this
"preventive war. ' 291 There is no such doctrine currently accepted in
international law and the suggestion that there should be due to the unique
challenges of the "war on terror, ' 292 has generally been met with
consternation. 293 The future of individual states unilaterally acting to prevent
perceived incipient threats in other nations across the globe is one that would
see the world as a smoking ruin. Iraq's aggression against Iran might have been
justified under such a doctrine but surely that is not a desirable result.
The drama is still unfolding. As of this writing, the United States has
announced that it will, within days, introduce a further draft resolution to the
UN Security Council that will again declare Iraq to be in material breach of
294
It

prior UN resolutions and will authorize the use of force to disarm Iraq.

remains entirely possible that some conjuncture of circumstances, such as
glaring violations of UN resolutions and international consensus on the

obduracy of the Iraqi regime, may lead to UN authorization for the use of force
(a point to which we return in discussing the costs of war). To date, however,
the rationales

and evidence

in support of war advanced by the U.S. are

unconvincing and the legal support for the U.S.' right to use force at this stage is

suspect. So we must ask again, why war?

OF WAR PROJECT, Aug. 20, 2002, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-intro.html.
291.

Steven E. Miller, Gambling on War: Force, Order, and the Implications of Attacking

Iraq, in WAR WITH IRAQ: COSTS, CONSEQUENCES, AND ALTERNATIVES 7-50 (Carl Keysen, et al.

eds., 2002).
292.

As President Bush's National Security Strategy, introduced in the fall of 2002, puts it:

The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and
technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass
destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The
United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against
ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to
deny, contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And,
as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging
threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by
hoping for the best.
THE WHITE

HOUSE,

THE

NATIONAL SECURITY

STRATEGY

OF THE UNITED STATES,

at

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0920-05.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2003); see also,
Michael Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at A37.
293. See, e.g., Anatol Lieven, The Push for War, 24 LONDON REV. OF BOOKS 19 (2002), at
http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/2002-10-22-lieven-lrb.asp?from=pubdate (last visited Mar.
13, 2003).
294. Elisabeth Bumiller, ProhibitedMissile is Tip of the Iceberg, Bush Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/intemational/middleeast/23PREX.html?th
(last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
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D. The Oil Factor
295
One popular hypothesis is that the coming war with Iraq is "about oil."
At one level, that is indubitably true. Oil has long been the constant, the "Holy
Grail" of U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq, the Gulf, and the wider Middle
East.2 96 As other reserves are depleted in the face of rising world demand for
energy, Iraq's considerable oil and gas riches will only increase in economic and
strategic value. Meanwhile, according to Vice President Dick Cheney's 2001
national energy policy report, U.S. demand for
oil will climb 32% by 2020,
297
while domestic production will remain steady.
The oil industry is dominated globally by five companies, of which two are
primarily based in the U.S. (Exxon/ Mobil and Chevron/Texaco), two are
primarily based in the UK, and one is based in France. 298 As the sanctions
regime against Iraq began to weaken, oil companies based in Russia, China, and
France inked deals with Iraq worth billions of U.S. dollars for post-sanction
exploitation of its oil fields. 299 U.S. and UK firms were shut out of the action by
the strict pro-sanctions policies of their own governments. 30 So, perhaps it is
not entirely coincidental that the two countries most adamant in pushing for war
are home to those four energy giants, thus eager to partake in the rich
opportunities Iraq offers.
According to James Paul:

A looming war against Iraq is only comprehensible in this light. For
all the talk about terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and human
rights violations by Saddam Hussein, these are not the core issues
driving U.S. policy. Rather, it is 'free access' to Iraqi oil and the
ultimate control over that oil by U.S. and UK companies that raises
the stakes high enough 30to1 set U.S. forces on the move and risk the
stakes of global empire.

295. See, e.g., Robert Jensen, We Won't be Fightingfor Freedom in Iraq, COUNTERPUNCH,
Jan. 2, 2003, at http://www.counterpunch.com/jensen0l022003.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2003);
Anthony Amove, Introduction to the Updated edition, in IRAQ UNDER SIEGE 18 (Anthony Amove
ed. 2002); Linda McQuaig, The Thing is, It is About Oil, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 16, 2003, at
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0216-04.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
296.
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298.
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299.
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300. Id. Pro-sanction policies, however, did not prevent Vice President Dick Cheney's
former company, Halliburton, from vying for the few contracts that were permissible under the
sanctions regime. Carola Hoyos, A Discreet Way of Doing Business with Iraq, TRUTHOUT, Nov. 3,
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Paul, supra note 7.
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Thus the claim that the drive for war is "about oil" has a certain grounding in
fact and logic.
Yet oil, as we have just noted, is a constant. In a sense, everything in U.S.
Middle East policy for the last fifty years or more has been "about oil." For that
very reason, however, "oil" cannot fully explain a shift in policy toward war.
Some new variable has entered the equation that has impelled the U.S. toward
war on Iraq after more than a decade during which the Hussein regime had
been, by most accounts, safely contained. That variable is ideology, played out
in a political environment radically altered by the events of 9/11. This is not to
suggest that the new trend in U.S. Middle East policy is not "about oil," it is, but
the role of oil as an end in itself and as a means to broader American objectives
has been transformed by the new ideological vision.
E. American Jihad
The most crucial change catalyzing the current push for war has been the
gathering influence of radical neo-conservative (neo-con) ideologues within the
Bush administration, concentrated primarily in the Department of Defense and
the office of the Vice President. 3 02 The general goal of this small but
extraordinarily influential clique of advisors and officials is to achieve unilateral
global domination through absolute military superiority. 3 0 3 Intellectuals close to
Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Policy Board member Richard Perle
have proselytized for this goal consistently since the early 1990's-until recently,
to the derision even of many conservatives. 3 0 4 The purposes of U.S. global

302. Kathleen Christison & Bill Christison, A Rose by Another Name, COUNTERPUNCH,
Dec. 13, 2002, at http://www.counterpunch.org/christisonl213.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003)
(describing in detail the network of"neo-cons" in the U.S. Defense Department).
303. Lieven supra note 293; see also Miller, supra note 291, at 2. One of the most coherent
iterations of the neo-con vision was by the Project for the New American Century, founded in 1997,
in its manifesto "Rebuilding America's Defenses, Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New
Century." REBUILDING AMERICA'S DEFENSES, STRATEGY, FORCES, AND RESOURCES FOR A NEW
CENTURY,

PROJECT

FOR

THE

NEW
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CENTURY,

Sept.

2000,

at

http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf. (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
The introduction to that document proclaims:
At present, the United States faces no global rival. America's grand strategy should
aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible
... Preserving the desirable strategic situation in which the United States now finds
itself requires a globally pre-eminent military capability both today and in the future.
Id. at I. Similar thinking infuses President Bush's "New National Security Strategy for the United
States," released in September, 2002, that posits that the U.S. military must be "strong enough to
dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling,
the power of the United States." THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (last visited Mar. 13,
2003).
304. Scott Ritter, the fonrmer UN weapons inspector, U.S. Marine, and avowed Republican,
claimed that until recently Paul Wolfowitz had been seen as a "raving lunatic of the far right;" Perle,
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hegemony, of course, are couched in such positive terms as promoting
democracy and spreading prosperity through free enterprise and free trade.
A number of these neo-conservative thinkers were critical to the U.S.
decision to spare the Hussein regime during the Gulf War, then chafed during
the years of the Clinton administration's policies of "containment." A more
aggressive policy was due, not just to address the problem of Iraq itself, but also
to display to other potential upstarts the willingness of the U.S. to deploy
overwhelming force to defeat any challenger. Several current administration
officials, including Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of
State Paul Wolfowitz, Defense Policy Board member Richard Perle, and
Zalmay Khalilzad, special envoy to the Iraqi opposition, joined other prominent
conservatives in signing a 1998 "open letter" to President Clinton urging that he
adopt "a comprehensive political and military strategy for bringing down
Saddam and his regime.' 30 5 Many of the neo-cons were strong supporters of the
Israeli right wing and saw the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as a step toward
transforming the regional power dynamic more favorably to Israel's
30 6
advantage.
By the advent of the younger George Bush to office, Hussein was
regaining strength, building a revenue stream through smuggling of oil, forging
commercial relationships with both neighboring and distant nations, and further
3 °7
weakening the already crumbling international support for the sanctions.
Hussein's dogged defiance of the U.S. and his ability to parlay meager resources
into a steadfastness of years was sending precisely the opposite of the required
message; he had already outlasted two American presidents. In the words of
veteran BBC Middle East Correspondent Tim Llewellyn:
Fortunately for Saddam, the West, with its inconsistent policies, lack
of focus, dismissal of any Iraqi and/or Arab interests and heavyhanded pursuit of puritanical punishment of a helpless people, has
reconstituted him as the only power in the land. It would be foolish to
say he is popular; but the administrators of sanctions, the purveyors of
Western moralizing, the supporters of Israel, the bombers of Mosul,
have restored him to a kind of credibility. 308
meanwhile, had been dubbed the "Prince of Darkness." RIVERS & PITT, supra note 166, at 66-68.
305. Hon. Stephen Solarz et al., Open Letter to the President (19 Feb. 1998), at
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/archive/1990s/openletter021998.htm. (last visited Mar. 13,
2003). Other signatories now in the Bush administration include Richard Armitage, John Bolton,
Elliot Abrams, Douglas Feith, Peter Rodman, David Wurmser, and Dov Zakheim. Id.
306. Glenn Kessler, U.S. Decision on Iraq has Puzzling Past, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2003,
at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A43909-2003Jan II ?Language
=printer. See also, Ann Pettifer, Zionism Unbound, COUNTERPUNCH, Dec. 14, 2002 at http://
www.counterpunch.org/pettiferl2l4.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
307.

See generally, Graham-BROWN, supra note 46.
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For his part, the second George Bush had already staked out a position in favor
of "taking out" Saddam Hussein, or at least his WMD capability, while on the
309
campaign trail.
In the first six months of the new Bush presidency, the "party of war" grew
increasingly frustrated as Secretary of Sate Colin Powell shepherded the policy
of "smart sanctions" forward, convinced that sanctions were simply postponing
an inevitable showdown with the Iraqi regime. 3 10 However, a series of policy
distractions ensured that the simmering debate remained unresolved and in the
3
background. 1
The political landscape changed dramatically due to the tragedies of
September 11, 2001, greatly empowering the hawks against their more
moderate counterparts in the Department of State. 3 12 Within hours of the
attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld directed his aides to generate plans for striking Iraq.
According to notes taken by an aide at the time, which were later revealed to
CBS news, Rumsfeld wanted the "best info fast. Judge whether good enough to
go after S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only UBL [Usama bin
Laden]. [The notes continued] Go massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and
not." 313

Since that seminal day, the neo-con agenda for Iraq, issued from the
Defense Department, has clearly overshadowed the more moderate approach
personified in Secretary of State Colin Powell. On September 17, 2001,
President Bush signed a secret memorandum outlining a war plan for
Afghanistan, but also ordered the Pentagon to begin military planning for an
invasion of Iraq. 3 14 Then, in January 2002, President Bush, in his State of the
Union Address, went public with the administration's crystallizing
sentiment
3 15
regarding Iraq, branding it as a member of an "axis of evil."
The militant evangelism of the neo-con clique and its near "theological"
obsession with Iraq is, at first blush, somewhat mystifying. There are
indications that some of them wholeheartedly believe that Saddam Hussein
poses an imminent threat to the U.S.; for example, Vice President Cheney is
described by administration insiders as "consumed" with the possibility that
http.'//www.cotuterpunch.org/llewellynOO62003.htnml(last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
309. Kessler, supra note 306, at Al.
310.

Id.

311.

Id.

312.

Id.; see also McFaul, supra note 255.

313. Plan for Iraq Attack Began on 9/11,CBS NEWS, Sept. 5, 2002, at http:I/
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/04/septemberl I/main520830.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
314.

Kessler, supra note 306, at AI.

315. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, The White House (Jan. 28, 2002), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-1 l.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
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terrorists might gain WMD from Iraq or other countries. 3 16 On the other hand,
the evidence in support of the "Iraqi threat," even in its "distant version," is so
palpably thin as to make widespread belief in it seem improbable, at least by
sophisticated policy analysts.
There are indications that the hawks are entirely aware of this evidentiary
weakness and have aggressively pressed the CIA to "cook" its reports to provide
the backing for a policy that has been selected in advance and on the basis of
other objectives. 3 17 Douglas Feith, an assistant to Undersecretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz, has overseen a rump intelligence unit inside the Department of
Defense. 3 18 The five-person team is designed to arm Wolfowitz and Donald
Rumsfeld with an alternate source of information to critique and undermine
CIA reports that have been regarded as insufficiently supportive of the drive for
war.
The unit has reportedly funneled unconfirmed data to top leaders,
including the President, from INC operators regarded by professional
intelligence as unreliable. 3 20 It has reportedly pressed especially hard, althouph
as yet unsuccessfully, to generate evidence of an Iraq-al-Qa'eda connection.
What, then, explains the neo-con determination to overthrow the Iraqi
regime? Cynics might cite the November 2002 mid-term elections and the
impending presidential campaign, coupled with consistently bleak economic
news, and chalk up the whole matter to electioneering. There may be a kernel of
truth in that interpretation; certainly the drive for war plays well with the
strongly pro-Israeli Christian fundamentalists who provide the electoral muscle
behind much of the neo-con strategy. 322 Still, war can be an extremely risky
strategy for re-election, as the President's father might remind him. 323 It would
seem likely that there is more to the explanation.
The key to the mystery may be the aforementioned special affinity that
many of the neo-cons bear for Israel, and not just for Israel but for its extreme
nationalist elements. 324 A number of senior Bush officials, including
Wolfowitz, Feith, and others, have spent time in Israel, or have strong

316.

Kessler, supra note 306, at Al.

317. Robert Dreyfuss, The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Dec. 16,
2002, at http://www.prospect.org/print/V13/22/dreyfuss-r.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
318. Id.; see also Eric Schmitt & Thorn Shanker, Pentagon Sets Up Intelligence Unit, N.Y.
Oct. 24, 2002, at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/l0/24/international/241NTE.html?ex
1036662890&ei=1 &en=a5c3b4808a6f28f9 (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
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affiliations with elites in the right-wing Likud Party, which is currently led by
Ariel Sharon. 325 Douglas Feith and Richard Perle, for example, helped coauthor a 1996 study for incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu
that advocated abandonment of the land-for-peace provisions of the Oslo
Accords and insistence that Palestinians acquiesce to Israel's "rights, especially
in their territorial dimension." 326 The paper also described removing Saddam
Hussein from power as "an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right[and] as a means of foiling Syria's regional ambitions." It went on to observe
that "Iraq's future could affect the strategic balance in the Middle East
profoundly."' 32 7 Intriguingly, it also urged reemphasis on military preemption in
place of retaliation for Palestinian violence. 328 A number of the Bush neo-cons,
including Perle and Donald Rumsfeld, are past or current board members of the
militarist Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, which is an organization
founded to promote Israel's security interests before American policymakers. 329 The neo-con-Likud connection, however, is not a sentimental one
and for some, one might speculate, not at all. 330 Rather, it is founded on a
particular vision of the central1 role that Israel plays in securing U.S. strategic
33
interests in the Middle East.
If an Iraqi attack on the U.S. seems altogether farfetched, it is not such a
stretch to say that a rejuvenated Iraq could again alter the regional balance of
power in ways that would be challenging to Israel. It is not, however, that Iraq
might attack Israel or use WMD against if offensively. Iraq, as we have already
seen, declined that option for the obvious reason that it would have invoked a
nuclear response from Israel, which is the only nuclear power in the Middle

325. Bill Keller, The Sunshine Warrior, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 22, 2002, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/22/magazine/22WOLFOWITZ.html?8hpist (last visited Mar. 13,
2003); Pettifer, supra note 306; Christison & Christison, supra note 302.
326.
NEW

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES, A CLEAN BREAK: A
FOR SECURING THE REALM, at http://www.israeleconomy.org/sratl.htm (last

STRATEGY

visited Mar. 13, 2003). David Wurmser, special assistant to Undersecretary of State for Arms John
Bolton - a fleo-con said to have been foisted on Colin Powell against his wishes, and one of the few
of his ilk in the State Department-also participated in the study. Christison & Christison, supra note
302.
327.

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES, supra

328.

Id.

329.

Christison & Christison, supra note 302.

note 326.

330. For example, Donald Rumsfeld, one of the strongest proponents of a war against Iraq,
was described by American Israel Public Affairs Committee head Morris Amitay as "correct but not
warm" vis-A-vis U.S.-Israeli relations. James Besser, Bush Cabinet Complete, No Jews at the Table,

THE JEWISH WK., Jan. 5, 2001, at http://abbc.com/islam/english/jewishp/usa/bushadm-tjw.htm (last
visited April 9, 2003).
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ZUNES, supra note 10, at 161-62.
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East. 332 Rather, it is a strong Iraq that deters Israel.333 Thus, the Bush
administration's "intention is partly to retain an absolute certainty of being able
to defend the Gulf against an Iraqi attack, but, more important, to retain for the
334
U.S. and Israel a free hand for intervention in the Middle East as a whole."
Another war on Iraq would also eliminate, for the foreseeable future, any
Israeli-Palestinian conflict on terms that satisfy
obstacle to a disposition of 3the
35
Israel's territorial ambitions.
Israel, for its part, seems content to remain in the background, quietly
exultant at the manifold benefits that U.S. policy now promises. 336 In the
words of writer Ben Lynfield:
It echoes the hawks in the Bush administration, but Israel has its own
agenda in backing a US attack on Iraq... Viewed through the eyes of
Israel's hawkish leaders, however, a US strike is not about Iraq only.
Decision makers believe it will strengthen Israel's hand on the
Palestinian front and throughout the region. Deputy Interior Minister
Gideon Ezra suggested this week that a US attack on Iraq will help
Israel impose a new order, sans Arafat, in the Palestinian territories.
'The more aggressive the attack is, the more it will help Israel against
the Palestinians. The understanding would be that what is good to do
in Iraq, is also good for here,' said Ezra. He said a US strike would
'undoubtedly deal a psychological blow' to the Palestinians. Yuval
Steinitz, a Likud party member of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and
Defense Committee, says he sees another advantage for Israel. The
installation of a pro-American government in Iraq would help Israel
vis-a-vis another enemy: Syria. 'After Iraq is taken by US troops and
we see a new regime installed as in Afghanistan, and Iraqi bases
become American bases, it will be very easy to pressure Syria to stop
supporting terrorist organizations like Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad, to

332.

See supra Section III.B.

333. It should be recalled that a pivotal point in the U.S.-Iraqi relationship was the 1990
speech by Saddam Hussein in which he threatened to use chemical weapons against Israel in
retaliationfor a hypothetical Israeli nuclear attack, upsetting, in some measure, the strategic
imbalance in Israel's favor. See supra Section lI.D.
334.

Lieven, supra note 293.

335. Id. Current Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has announced willingness to cede
40% of the West Bank and 75% of the Gaza Strip to a future Palestinian state. Judith Miller and
Michael Wines, Sharon Gives Tentative Backing to US Roadmap, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2002, at
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/12/05/1038950148894.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
336. Dana Milbank, Group urges pro-Israel Leaders Silence on Iraq, WASH. POST, Nov.
27, 2002, at A13. Indeed, the Washington Post reported the circulation of a memo by the "Israel
Project" to pro-Israeli leaders in the U.S., advising them to remain silent on the possibility of a U.S.Iraq confrontation, as "[y]ou do not want Americans to believe that the war on Iraq is being waged
to protect Israel rather than to protect America." Id.
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allow the Lebanese army to dismantle Hizbullah, and maybe to put an
end to the Syrian occupation in Lebanon,' he says. 'If this happens we
337
will really see a new Middle East.'
Like the above-quoted Israelis, the ambitions of the neo-cons do not stop at
Iraq. Instead, carrying on with themes previewed in the Netanyahu policy paper,
Iraq is seen as a first step, or perhaps linchpin, in "redrawing the map" of the
entire Middle East. 338 The destabilization that many see as a possible outcome
of a war, therefore, is viewed by the hawks as an opportunity to be embraced.
Iraq, under a pro-Western leadership with its enormous oil reserves, would
diminish the strategic value of Saudi Arabia. With Iraq as an alternative source
for oil imports, the U.S. could pressure Saudi Arabia in a way that is currently
impossible and negate Saudi leverage with the U.S. vis-a-vis the Israel/Palestine
conflict. 339 A new Iraq would be a beachhead from which to rid the Middle
East of autocracies, the wellsprings of terrorism, in this view, install democratic
governments, and make the region a haven for free enterprise and
340
development.
34 1
But the case of the neo-cons is not necessarily one of "dual loyalties."
There is, in the outlook of many of these ideologues, virtually no "daylight"
between the interests of Israel and the United States. Both are democracies
embattled by terrorism and thus share identical concerns. 342 Still, the real
motivations for the coming war have not been rolled out before the U.S. public,
who might question a campaign with many immediate benefits to Israel's right
wing and few to the United States. Simultaneously, the ultimate end,
breathtaking in scope and audacity (interventionism on a grand, almost
unprecedented scale) is likewise not yet ready for public consumption and may
never be.

337.

Ben Lynfield, Israel Sees Opportunity in U.S. Strike on Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCI.
Aug. 30, 2002 at 8. The same view has been articulated by neocon David Wurmser,
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Deceptions: Saddam is Hitler and It's
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This rosy vision of a revolutionized Middle East has its attractions, as does
the more modest and realistically attainable simple riddance of the current Iraqi
regime. A humanist and democratic government of Iraq would be a boon for the
people of that country, a model by which progressive forces may be galvanized
forward in a region now typified by authoritarianism, and a resource-rich friend
to the United States. War is, at the same time, highly risky, and fraught with
possibilities for disaster. Thus, we must next consider the downside, or the
potential costs of the coming war with Iraq.
F. Paying the Piper
Calculating a war's cost/benefit ratio is not easy; many variables could lead
to a wide variety of outcomes with widely disparate costs and benefits.
However, some costs are virtually inevitable and only their magnitude is in
question. It seems necessary to start with the cost that, morally speaking, should
concern us the most: deaths of innocent Iraqis and also of U.S. and other
"coalition of the willing" soldiers. Following that, this article will examine
economic costs, the danger of regional destabilization, the possibility of
increased terrorism, damage to the integrity of the UN and international law,
and losses in the standing of the U.S. in the world community, including those
losses within the United States itself.
Deaths and injuries. Only recently has public discussion of the war in the
United States been trained on the single greatest potential cost of an upcoming
war, the likely massive death toll that will be suffered by Iraqi civilians. These
are innocents, who themselves have suffered repression at the hands of the Iraqi
regime and are no more responsible for its misdeeds than
we are (perhaps less
34 3
so given our record of past support for Saddam Hussein).
Casualty figures from the first Gulf War, between 100,000-200,000 killed
directly in war with over half of them being civilians, serve as a kind of
benchmark for the possible death toll in the coming invasion. 344 There are
reasons to believe, however, that this number may be considerably greater this
time. In part this would be due to the defense strategy of the Iraqi army,
anticipated to rely on urban warfare to partially neutralize superior U.S. or
coalition air power. 345 Reliance on much-touted "smart" technology (bombs,
night vision goggles, etc.) may reduce, but will not eliminate, "collateral
damage." A U.N. contingency plan has forecast the possibility of 500,000 Iraqis

343.

Supra Section II.C.

344.

Supra Section lI.E.

345. William D. Nordhaus, The Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq, in WAR WITH
IRAQ: COSTS, CONSEQUENCES, AND ALTERNATIVES 57-58 (2002). An invading force may also face
substantial rural opposition from Iraq's large tribal population. Michael Stackman, Iraq's Tribes
May Provide a Secret Weaponfor Hussein, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2002 at A3.
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346
suffering injury that would require medical treatment during the war.
An even greater concern centers on the possible indirect impacts of war, in
light of infrastructural devastation caused by the first war, and the subsequent
twelve years of sanctions. 347 The same UN report discusses the possibility that
10 million Iraqi citizens, including more than 2 million refugees, will need
immediate assistance to stave off hunger and disease in the aftermath of a
war, 34 8 Yet another group has confirmed, not surprisingly, the particular
vulnerability of children to the impacts of a new war, predicting a "grave
humanitarian disaster" in which thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of
children will die. 349 War does not just kill individuals. It also destroys societies
by smashing their institutions, deforming social life, and scarring individual
psyches into aberrant350behavior. The wrecked bodies are only the most visible
human costs of war.
American casualties may also be significant. The relatively small number
of U.S. soldier lives lost in the first Gulf War may be reassuring since such a
"positive" scenario is within the realm of possibility. But urban warfare is
necessarily more complex and messy, and it may lead to many more
U.S./coalition casualties. 35 1 Needless to say, even the stated justifications for
the war imply a much longer campaign, followed by a military occupation, with
attendant risks of protracted fighting. 352 It is also critical to keep in mind the
likely indirect casualties on our side of the ledger, in the form of a second round
of "Gulf War syndrome."
Direct and indirect economic costs. The economic costs of a just and
necessary war should never be a deterrent from waging the war. 353 However,
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350. An International Study Team dispatched to Iraq in January, 2003, found that Iraqi
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COUNTERPUNCH, Jan. 27, 2003 at http://www.counterpunch.org/fisk0I282003.htm (last visited
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351.
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352.

Id. at 63-64.
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visited Apr. 9, 2003).
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these costs weigh all the heavier when the moral and legal justifications for war
are in doubt. Estimating potential costs, however, is an exercise in guesswork,
as those costs may run from relatively minimal to astronomic, depending on the
course and duration of fighting and post-war commitment of military
resources. 354 How the bill is apportioned among possible coalition nations will
also influence our share. In the Gulf War, the U.S. paid only 20% twenty
percent of the $80 billion in direct costs, while much of the rest was
underwritten by two countries, Germany and Saudi Arabia, that may not sign on
for another war venture. 355 If the U.S. has to pay out large sums to coax
coalition partners, as it did in the first Gulf War, whatever they contribute will
be at least partially offset by these pay-outs. 356 The United States has already
agreed to provide Turkey with some $15 billion in aid in order to secure its
agreement to permit U.S. troops to use Turkish bases during an assault on
Iraq. 357 A study conducted by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and
released in December, 2002, estimated the costs of both short and long military
campaigns, suggesting a range of direct military costs of $50-140 billion. In358a
worst case scenario, however, total costs of a war could approach $2 trillion.
In fact, the U.S. economy has already begun to pay the price of war-related
uncertainty in the form of a doubling in the price of oil over the ten-months
leading up to September, 2002, and periodic price spikes coinciding with each
announcement by a U.S. official threatening war. 359A360
stock market swoon in
January, 2003, was attributed in large part to war jitters.
Other likely costs of war are both tangible and intangible, and accordingly
difficult to quantify. Here we must consider likely damages to historical and
religious sites, cultural artifacts, and the like. 36 1 Damage to the environment is
also likely to be great, whether or not both Iraqi and coalition forces lay waste
to the oil fields as they did in 1991. For example, the U.S. military has stated its
intention to continue employing highly effective, but potentially toxic, depleted
362
uranium shells.
Regional Destablilization. An invasion of Iraq can trigger regional
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destabilization in a number of ways. The first possibility is that the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein will lead to the internal dissolution of the Iraqi state along
sectarian, ethnic, and political lines and even to outright civil war. 363 One stark
prediction is that:
Immediately after the boot is lifted from the neck of the Iraqis, a
bloodbath is likely to ensue as each group pours out its anger at
decades of despotism, enormous suffering under the sanctions, and
real and perceived injustices of one group against the other. Even
without blood, there will be chaos within the ruins of a police state
that never gave the Iraqis any opportunity to participate in
36
governing.
The power vacuum within the state resulting from overthrow of the strong
central government, might easily be exploited by outside forces, preeminent
among them is Iran. 365 This cost can be avoided only by the investment of huge
resources for nation building, under the aegis of long-term military occupation,
whether by the U.S. alone or a in concert with other nations. A major dilemma
will be faced, however, if a new Iraqi regime asks the United States to leave the
366
country, which is a likely possibility.
While the above scenario mostly implicates Iraq and its immediate
neighbors, destabilization may unfold along a different track, as Arab and other
regimes perceived to have aided or even passively acquiesced in a U.S.-led
invasion of an Arab country are challenged by angry and disillusioned
constituents.3 67 This form of destabilization could occur virtually anywhere in
the region, although likely in some mixture with more purely local grievances.
Increased terrorism. Closely linked with the just-mentioned cost of
destabilization, an attack on Iraq may ignite anger and resentment against the
United States, and with it a rise in terrorism, just as it causes the siphoning away
of many resources from the struggle against terror to the multitude of challenges
in Iraq. 368 U.S./coalition troops, whether in Iraq itself or in any other Middle
Eastern nation with a U.S. military presence, such as Afghanistan, will be
highly likely targets. However, businessmen, students, tourists, aid workers,
missionaries, journalists, and others may not be immune. Increased terrorism
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Mackey, supra note 12, at 28-29.

364.
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Fisk, supra note 337.

367.

Miller, supra note 291, at 27.

368. Id. at 25; JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTIL PEACE, IRAQ: WHAT
NEXT? (2003), at http://www.ceip.org/lraq (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
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369
within the United States is also a distinct possibility.
Marginalizing the UN and international law. It should be clear from the
discussion in Section I1 that the United States has already done much to debase
the UN and international law in its dealings with Iraq over the last twelve years
of lawless behavior. 370 The impact of war on the UN, to some extent, turns on
the circumstances under which a war begins and the position the UN has taken
with respect to it. Irrespective of this, war is certain to exact a toll. As long-time
students of international law and organizations Richard Falk and David Kreiger
observe:

There are two main ways to ruin the UN: to ignore its relevance in
war/peace situations, or to turn it into a rubber stamp for geopolitical
operations of dubious status under international law or the UN
Charter. Before September 11, Bush pursued the former approach;
since then-by calling on the UN to provide the world's remaining
37 1
superpower with its blessings for an unwarranted war - the latter.
Repeated violations of Iraqi legal rights by the U.S. have seemingly numbed
congressional leaders and the broader U.S. public to the very meaning of
international law. Still, the attempt of the Bush administration to introduce a
new principle of international law permitting "preemptive strike" by a nation
against another, solely at its own discretion, represents a quantum, and highly
dangerous, innovation. Were such a principle to prevail, we would have
reversed decades of advances, modest but hard won, toward peace-making and
372
returned to an era of dominance through might.
The new pariah state. Lastly, this article considers the impact of war on
the standing of the United States in the world community. It is abundantly clear
that the push for war is exerting tremendous stress on our alliances and
friendships abroad, and is contributing to mounting anti-American sentiment in

369. Matthew Brzezinski, Fortress America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/magazine/23FORTRESS.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003);
David Johnston & James Risen, Agencies Warn of Lone Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/national/23TERR.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
370. Supra Section II. U.S. handling of the 1999 Kosovo crisis also contributed to
marginalizing the UN. Phyllis Bennis, Real Reform at the UN, THE PROGRESSIVE RESPONSE,
(2000), at http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/progresp/volume4/v4n34_body.html#real. One of
the latest affronts committed by the U.S. against the UN was when it successfully pressured the UN
to release the 12,000 page Iraqi report on WMD early, but only to permanent members of the
Security Council. See Linda Heard, Baghdad Framed, UN Shamed, COUNTERPUNCH, Dec. 19,
2002, at http://www.counterpunch.org/heardl219.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
371. Richard Falk & David Kreiger, Subverting the UN, THE NATION, Nov. 4, 2002, at
2002 WL 2210961.
372.

See generally David Krieger, The Bush Administration'sAssault on InternationalLaw,

in THE IRAQ CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Richard Falk & David Krieger eds., 2003).
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a wide variety of countries. 3 73 The impact of the war cannot be isolated from
the impacts of many other unilateral moves by the Bush administration since its
inception. Withdrawing from the Kyoto Global Warming Treaty, refusing to
sign the Rome Statute forming the International Criminal Court, and other acts
of disrespect for law and the interests of others, all have taken their toll against
our global standing. Speaking of the erosion of British public support for the
Iraq war, Anatol Lieven comments: "Basically, it is absurd to treat the views
and interests of an ally with ostentatious and systematic contempt and then
'374
expect that the citizens of that ally will automatically support you in a crisis."
Perhaps only temporarily, our relations with Germany and France may be at
their lowest ebb since World War II. One shudders to imagine what sentiments
are being stirred in the Arab and Muslim worlds against us for the belligerence
of our government toward Iraq.
What is at stake is not simply the coming war, although that is crucial. The
paramount issue is the manner in which the United States will conduct itself in
the world. Will it be a respectful ally, perhaps a "first among equals" in the
community of nations, or a triumphalist, unconstrained new imperium, impelled
by a messianic zeal to remake the world according to our perceived
advantage? 375 Moral legitimacy is an important political resource for
galvanizing collective action, as was evident in the aftermath of September 11,
2001. We are rapidly squandering that vital capital now.
What is the cost of the push for war on our standing in our own eyes? What
is the value of living in a society in which leaders model respect for law and
commitment to conflict resolution through peaceful means? On the contrary,
what is the social impact of a leadership that conducts its relations with other
nations through threats and application of violence, and flouts the laws of the
community? We rarely examine relationships between the conduct of foreign
policy and social behavior in the United States. Will another hidden cost of
bellicosity and flagrant disregard for law be3played
out in another outburst in
6
the halls of our schools in the years to come? 7

373. Jane Perlez, Americans Abroad Cope with Anger at U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2003,
at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/19/intemational/I9AMER.html?th (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
374.
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375.
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Serge Schmemann, The Quarrel over Iraq Gets Ugly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, § 4,
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376. See generally MacGowan, supra note 1.Speculating about the connection between a
violent foreign policy and "youth violence" in the United States, arguing that the latter is simply part
of a society-wide problem, comprehending adult violence in a variety of spheres, rather than a
phenomenon with distinct causes. The connection in the particular case of Iraq may not be as distant
as one would imagine. In October, 2002, Gotham Games released a video game at $40 entitled
"Conflict: Desert Storm" that permits players to participate in a "special operations" team strike
against Iraq. See Petrilla Entertainment, Gotham Games, at http://www.questforhussein.com
(official website of the company that carries the game). In the denouncement, the player
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War is not necessary to meet the challenge constituted by the regime of
Saddam Hussein. As brutal and wily as he may be, lawful and non-violent
means continue to exist that would neutralize any realistic threat emanating
from Iraq, while avoiding the costs described above. This article will now
review these alternatives.
IV. POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Our search for alternatives to war in the confrontation with Iraq should be
animated by several fundamental principles. First, the alternatives must be
consistent with international law. Respect for international law is not simply an
expedient to be discarded in the service of short-term interest. Rather, it should
be a bedrock principle of U.S. foreign policy, consistent with our commitment
as a people to democracy and the rule of law. 37 7 Constraints on the exercise of
our power are an acceptable cost for the legitimacy and moral authority that are
gained by acting within international law. Nor is there need to act lawlessly
because a legal framework exists through the UN for countries to take drastic
measures to address truly acute challenges to peace and international security,
and, in the 78aftermath of the Cold War, the UN has done so on numerous
3
occasions.
Second, the alternatives must effectively address the problem presented by
the current Iraqi regime. This requires a sense of proportion; neither over-nor
underestimating the dimensions of the challenge. Our review of the historical
record of U.S.-Iraqi relations has hopefully sharpened that sense. While Saddam
Hussein almost certainly does not currently pose an imminent threat to the U.S.
379
and personal
or to his neighbors, his history, ideological commitments,
38
are sufficiently indicative of future danger so that actions out of the
ambition
ordinary are both justified and wise. Iraqi citizens, of course, suffer severe

assassinates the foreign leader, whose features are modeled after Saddam Hussein. Enterprising
California high school student Jose Petrilla, 19, is selling his web-based "Quest for Hussein" game
for $3.95, offering similar opportunities for "catharsis." It is a sequel to his highly successful "Quest
for al-Qa'eda,"which has been downloaded from the internet over two million times. Farhad
Manjoo, Pulling the trigger on Saddam, COMPUTERS AND THE INTERNET, at
=
http://www.buzzle.com/editorials/1I -I2-2002-30135.asp?viewPage I (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
377. In the words of Kaysen, Steinbruner, and Malin: "Government by consensually
formulated law is the defining feature of American democracy, and as a practical matter the threat to
freedom has much more to do with the possible defects in the internal rule of law than with the
actions of any external aggressor." Carl Kaysen, et al., U.S. National Security Policy: In Search of
Balance, in WAR WITH IRAQ: COSTS, CONSEQUENCES, AND ALTERNATIVES 5 (2002).
378.
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(David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., 2000).
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repression on a daily basis and are in immediate and pressing need for relief.
There is one more value, humility that should inform this inquiry. The
shameful record of U.S. dealings with Iraq demands nothing less. The fact that
we have had so much to do with the havoc wreaked by Saddam Hussein over
time means that we bear some quantum of moral responsibility for his crimes.
That being so, we must be especially scrupulous not to inflict any more needless
harm on innocents. Together, these principles suggest that we should adopt the
following package of mutually reinforcing policy alternatives.

A. Immediately Renounce Regime Change in Favorof Regional
Democratization
Encouraging the emergence of democratic governments in the Middle East
is a legitimate and laudable aim of U.S. policy in the Middle East. It cannot be
accomplished, however, by instigating coups, or by threat of military force.
"Regime change," at least as envisioned by the U.S. government, would violate
Iraqi sovereignty and thus international law. 38 1 Even a regime change mandated
by the UN Security Council would be a startling departure from settled
international legal principles of sovereignty and would likely violate the UN
Charter. Regime change is simply inconsistent with international law and must
be abandoned as a goal of U.S. foreign policy. The sooner we realize that we do
not have the right to change the government of another sovereign nation at will,
the better the public discussion and our relations with Iraq will be.
Renouncing regime change may have far-reaching political benefits as
well. There is a sense in which vilifying Saddam Hussein and making him the
focal point of our policy has empowered him, both domestically and regionally.
There is, as one observer has wryly noted, a certain glamour to villainy. 382 He
is, for many in the Arab world, and quite possibly a large number in Iraq
itself,383 a symbol of determined resistance to U.S.-lsraeli hegemony, a pedestal
to which we have lifted him through our lavish attention. De-escalation of the
rhetoric against Saddam Hussein may cause him to deflate to his proper, rather
minor, dimensions. In the long run, this may empower domestic forces against
him, forces which, under prevailing circumstances, are forced to swim against a
current of Iraqi nationalism. If regime change is accomplished via invasion, we
should expect that same current to push at the footing of any successor regime.
Second, it is impossible to predict how differently the Iraqi regime might
respond to other aspects of our policy were its demise not so avidly sought. We

381.

Supra Section II.G.

382. Brian Walden, Walden on Villains: Saddam Hussein Transcript, BBC NEWS, at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/education/walden/sadindx.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
383.

Llewellyn, supra note 308.
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know, at a minimum, that some part of Saddam Hussein's resistance to weapons
inspections derived from fears that information gained in the process would be
used to kill him, which is not an unreasonable position considering that the U.S.
Overall, the Iraqi response to
was doing everything it could to do just that.
inspections might very well have been different and more cooperative if the
U.S. had not loudly and repeatedly insisted on regime change as a condition for
sanctions relief.385 Not only was acquiescing to inspections flatly against the
interest of the Iraqi leadership, but, coming as it did without international
approval, it could have had no legitimacy whatsoever. Rather, it was simply a
naked American diktat - galling and offensive.
Illusions should not be held, however, concerning the prospects for
democracy in Iraq: the conditions are daunting, to say the least. Even assuming
the best of U.S. intentions, the realities of the country have not changed. It is
still a fractious society with deep ethnic and sectarian fissures, an incompletely
developed sense of Iraqi national identity, and a tradition, in the modern era, of
political violence. 386 The Iraqi opposition groups, to date, have demonstrated
only spectacular incompetence and venality, and precious little support from
within Iraq. 387 That is no doubt why the U.S. has been busily planning for a
military occupation and administration of the country that will last at least 18
or more. 388 Afghanistan
months, and many believe could extend for a decade 389
ahead.
challenges
the
of
stands as a sobering harbinger
Moreover, there is reason to be skeptical at to just what intentions the U.S.
does have for democracy in Iraq. To begin, supporting Iraqi democracy would
run completely counter to tradition: U.S. policy toward the Middle East region,
and often, elsewhere, has far more frequently subverted democracy than
promoted it. 390 In the most recent example of our anti-democratic practices in
the Arab world, we are actively seeking to depose Palestinian Authority
of1the vote in the most free elections
President Yasser Arafat, who won 88% 39
witnessed in the region in the last decade.
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As to Iraq itself, one of the constituent groups that has been active in the
U.S.-backed opposition seeks restoration of the monarchy, which was swept
away in the first republican coup in Iraq in 1958. 392 Of the two leaders most
actively promoted by the U.S. government over the last year or so, former
general Nizar al-Khazraji has been implicated in the gassings of Kurdish
villages in 1988 and is now under house arrest in Denmark facing charges of
war crimes. 3 93 The other U.S. champion of democracy is Ahmad Chalabi, who,
after his conviction on bank fraud charges in Jordan, fled that country in the
trunk of a car. 394 Nor is it clear that the Bush administration neo-cons will be
ready to accept the kind of democracy envisioned by the Iraqis themselves. Four
points of potential divergence seem immediately probable.
First, democracy for the neo-cons, on the face of it, seems to involve
elections, the rule of law, and free enterprise-the classic, liberal version of
participatory democracy. To the Iraqis, this might look very much like a
formula for neocolonialism where local elites, protected by a government and
legal system, are "free" to engage in commercial deals with international
corporations to their mutual enrichment (benefits trickling down to the masses,
of course). Given past history, ideology, and prevailing conditions in the
country, Iraqis might prefer something more along the lines of a command
economy and welfare state, as had served them well before their long, and still
continuing, nightmare. 39 5 Iraqi democracy might privilege economic and social
rights over civil and political rights, the latter being seen as a luxury for more
stable conditions and more prosperous states. Whether the neo-cons will be
open to such a version of Iraqi democracy, should it emerge, is open to
question. Of course, we know what to call a "democracy" that is not chosen by
the governed.
Second, an Iraqi democracy that is genuinely representative of the
country's population will be dominated by Shi'a Muslims. 396 Ideologically, such
a government may be more closely aligned to Iran than to the U.S. What will
happen when a democratically elected Shi'a Iraqi government politely and
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firmly asks U.S./coalition troops to leave, as they surely will? 397 Any refusal
would reveal the lie, while any agreement would open the door for increased
Iranian influence. There may be less to fear in that than we imagine, but
somehow one does not imagine the neo-cons viewing this all with equanimity.
In their view, Iran is the most consequential country in the area. 398 How we
finesse this easily predictable dilemma will say much about the U.S.
commitment to Iraqi democracy.
Third, Iraqi democracy must come to some accommodation with the
legitimate aspirations of the long-suffering and long-exploited Kurdish
people. 3 99 Torn by infighting, their precise goals have not always been clear,
but at a minimum they will demand and deserve some form of autonomy within
the Iraqi state. This will unquestionably arouse extreme agitation in Turkey,
which has violently opposed Kurdish autonomy anywhere out of fears of
heightened agitation within its own Kurdish minority. It will be interesting to
see how the neo-cons, for whom Turkey ranks second only to Israel in regional
strategic importance, finesse this contradiction between the demands of Iraqi
democracy and the demands of a treasured strategic ally.
Finally, any Iraqi democracy that accurately reflects the sentiments of the
Iraqi people will be more resolutely pro-Palestinian than the regime of Saddam
Hussein. 4 0 This does not mean that a democratic Iraqi government will do
anything effective to aid the Palestinians in their struggle with Israel in the short
term (neither has Saddam Hussein, notwithstanding his politically calculated
but functionally insignificant contributions to families of Palestinian
"martyrs"). 4 0 1 But there is deep and abiding sympathy for the Palestinians
throughout the Arab world and there is a specific Iraqi-Palestinian solidarity
that derives from a sense of common victim-hood at the hands of Israel and the
U.S. Quite apart from these emotional ties, there is very little in U.S.-Israeli
hegemony over the region that is favorable to the national interests of Iraq, as
these are likely to be defined by Iraqi leaders. None of these facts jibe well with
402
the commitments of the "Israelo-centric" neo-cons.
In light of the above considerations, Iraqi democracy under the aegis of a
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post-war, American supervised occupation seems at best to be a distant
proposition. A puppet regime pliable to U.S. direction, similar to that of Karzai
in Afghanistan, seems the more probable outcome, at least in the short- to
medium-term. 40 3 Were we not to go to war, and the U.S. suddenly "got
democracy" and sincerely committed to promoting a democratic Iraqi
government wherever that process might lead, is there anything that could be
done to advance the cause while the Hussein regime remains in power?
Unfortunately, the chances are low. This may mean that another half-generation
of Iraqis and beyond is consigned to life under Hussein's repression.
However, we should not forget that many Iraqis tolerated that repression40as4
a necessary cost of economic growth and their own material advancement.
We also cannot discount the possibility that some share of the repression stems
from the leadership's sense of embattlement and insecurity. 405 Thus, renouncing
regime change may have the residual effect of diminishing the worst of the Iraqi
regime's excesses.
There are some modest initiatives that can be taken: intergovernmental
dialogue, educational and cultural exchange, conditioning aid on
democratization, technical support, diplomatic pressure, and other such
techniques, all tempered with a light hand and a large dose of patience. These
measures may seem pathetically inadequate in the short-term, and laughably
naive as well. A cooling off period of some duration will surely be needed
before any such initiatives may be taken. But authentic democratization is a
process of decades, rather than months. 40 6 We cannot know how the Iraqi
regime might respond under a vastly transformed, non-threatening atmosphere
without trying.
Democracy should be promoted not just in Iraq, but in the Middle East as a
whole. The region needs it and a recent Saudi initiative signals growing
readiness for it.40 7 Democratization in Iraq would be invigorated were it to
become part of a popularly embraced regional transformation, rather than the
lone experiment in American nationbuilding. That raises yet another problem:
distrust of the United States in the Arab and Muslim worlds currently runs so
deep that, even though we may possess the best democratic ideas and knowhow, we may not, at this point, be their most effective purveyors. 408 Instead, a
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will be needed, with the U.S. perhaps
multilateral democratic support project
40 9
role.
hands-off
or
secondary
a
playing
Regional democratization may produce its uncomfortable moments for us
as Islamist groups that have long been building grassroots strength may sweep
to electoral victory in a number of countries of the region.4 10 Bumps in the road
will have to be endured as the rhetoric of these groups is put to the test of
performance. Candidly, the U.S. may be forced to give up some of its
"privileges" in the region, for example sharing a greater portion of the resource
wealth with the peoples of the region than in the past.
But real democratization that is not a sham or a cover for American
indirect rule, may repay us in spades if it ultimately abates conflict and
promotes regional stability. It is, with all its difficulties, a prize worth striving
for - for the sake of the Iraqi people and for our own long-term interests.
B. Immediately End Enforcement of No-Fly Zones
This policy shift is mandated by our first animating principle above. The
no-fly zones have no basis in international law and should be ended
immediately and without condition. 4 11 As a practical matter the zones have
never worked to accomplish their stated objectives, have been costly in human
lives and property, and have been hugely costly to maintain, requiring
approximately $1 billion per year. 4 12 Ironically, they have also given the Iraqi
regime a tool with which to ratchet up tensions by the simple expedient of firing
U.S.-British warplanes-a tool which it has used at
a few rockets at overflying
4 13
past.
the
in
points
several
C. End Comprehensive Sanctions in FavorofArms Embargo and Continued
Inspections
A rigid arms embargo against Iraq is also a valid tool of U.S. policy. Given
Iraq's track record of aggression, continuing weapons inspection under a UNsanctioned program is more than reasonable. It is even possible that the arms
with great skepticism. N. Janardhan, U.S. Mideast Democracy Plan Undemocratic, Critics Say,
INT'L PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 19, 2002, at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/ 1219-06.htm
(last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
409. This, given the unilateralist tendencies of the neo-cons, introduces another wrinkle into
the "democracy after war" scenario.
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embargo should be extended to cover more categories of weapons, including
conventional ones, although adequate consideration must be given to Iraq's
legitimate needs for self-defense.
In December 2002, after a four-year hiatus, weapons inspectors resumed
work in Iraq, under the stricter UN mandate laid out in UNSCR 1441. Skeptics
of the approach advocated here are likely to see the return of inspectors to Iraq
as the latter's last gasp effort to avoid invasion and thus, a vindication of
President Bush's tough diplomacy in the preceding months. There is little
question that, given the generally bellicose atmosphere prevailing in U.S.-Iraqi
relations, little other than the figurative "gun to the head" would have achieved
this result. We will never know, however, whether a similar result might have
been achieved years ago had we scaled back our anti-Saddam words and deeds
and adopted a more broadly conciliatory approach.
Be that as it may, the inspectors are on the ground and working, and
despite some inadequacies in the level of cooperation of the Iraqis, there is
every reason that they should remain for as long as it takes to complete their
mission. 4 14 Their very presence deters Iraq from any attempt to use or develop
proscribed weapons, and a thorough course of inspections is the best existing
means to uncover direct evidence of the current status of Iraq's WMD
capabilities.
Assuming against all odds that war is averted, reevaluation of the current
inspections regime will be necessary within the next six months to a year. This
is because the current inspections regime is highly intrusive against Iraqi
sovereignty, authorizing what amounts to a small-scale roving military
occupation of the country. 4 15 This intrusion is legal, however, in light of
Security Council backing, and it is justified by Iraq's past behavior. But such a
compromise of sovereignty is undoubtedly humiliating to the Iraqi government
and will wear over time. Resentment breeds resistance and, if the inspections
continue indefinitely without modification, we will be headed at some point for
another high-stakes confrontation. The inspections regime should therefore be
scaled back, and then phased out at the earliest practicable date.
Experts in sanctions enforcement maintain that means exist to enforce a
long-term, strict arms embargo, primarily through technology-enhanced
policing of Iraq's borders. 4 16 Iraq may not be pleased with this development,
but the occasions for confrontation will be much diminished if enforcement of
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the embargo can be done less intrusively. 4 17 Of course, a condition of the
success of this program would be the cooperation of the countries surrounding
Iraq.4 18 Multinational support for border enforcement may also be necessary.
Both may be gained by offering an end to economic sanctions against Iraq.
Countries such as Jordan and Syria have ties of affinity to, and burgeoning trade
relations with, Iraq, at this point illicit, that make them exceptionally anxious to
see the sanctions chapter closed.
Comprehensive sanctions that have had such ruinous effects against the
Iraqi people should be ended under any circumstances. They have been ruinous
to innocent Iraqis, taking hundreds of thousands of lives. They have
strengthened the Hussein regime by causing increased dependence on the
central government. 4 19 They have violated a number of basic and sacred
principles of international law. 42 Dual use restrictions, in particular, should be
dropped in their entirety. Some risks are involved that make these goods open to
misappropriation, although enhanced tracking of them is also technically
feasible. 42 1 That is required to unblock the flow of goods essential to rebuilding
the crumbling Iraqi civilian infrastructure. As we have seen, it is infrastructural2
42
reconstruction that is the real key to ending unjustified Iraqi civilian misery.
Ending sanctions will also remove one of the prime sources of enmity toward
the United States in the Arab and Muslim world-a political benefit of
incalculable value.
D. Aggressively Promote Regional Disarmament
Why do countries in the contemporary era pursue weapons of mass
destruction? Why, in particular, has Iraq sought weapons of mass destruction?
These are important questions, one would think, in understanding the root
causes of the problem of WMD, which might well be essential to eliminating
WMD. Our all-too-facile operating assumption seems to have always been that
Saddam Hussein's drive to gain weapons of mass destruction, and his acts of
aggression, are an outgrowth of his unquenchable ambition for regional
dominance, or more simply, of his "evil nature." That theory cannot be entirely
42 3
discounted.
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Another interpretation is possible as to the Iraqi WMD that is equally, and
in some respects, more at home with the facts. The interpretation is that the
Iraqis have sought WMD in the first place as a deterrent against stronger
neighbors, such as Iran and most of all, Israel. 424 Iran is a large, populous
country and has not hidden its resentments of the Iraqi regime. 425 Israel is, after
all, the only nuclear power in the Middle East, and it attacked Iraq in 1981. We
have already seen that Saddam Hussein's 1990 threat to use chemical weapons
against Israel was posed as a response to a hypothetical nuclear attack from that
country. 426 This interpretation is thoroughly consistent with what we know
about arms races in other parts of the world, namely that weapons acquisitions
by one country inevitably lead to the same or greater weapons being sought by
its competitors.
Viewed in this light, singling out Iraq for disarmament in a region
saturated with high-end military hardware is unfair and more than likely will be
unsuccessful in the long run. It is naive to expect Iraq, or other Arab countries
for that matter, to accept life under the pall of Israeli military superiority in
perpetuity, or to tolerate other threats to their security, that we would never
accept ourselves. If overwhelming military superiority is seen as necessary to
ensure Israel's survival, that belief should be checked against the facts: this
military superiority, instead, is the mantle under which Israeli expansionism
into the West Bank has unfolded. The results of that expansion may ultimately
be more threatening to Israel, although in political rather than military ways,
coupled with a peace
than a less unequal balance of power with its neighbors
427
that adequately addresses Palestinian national interests.
This logic has not always escaped us. Article 14 of UN Security Council
Resolution 687, which laid out all of the post-Gulf War cease-fire conditions,
construed Iraq's disarmament as a first step in the direction of establishing the
Middle East as a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. 428 No action has
ever been taken to effectuate that provision and an important opportunity has
lain dormant. Among the first steps that should be taken, as a part of a
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comprehensive program of regional disarmament, is demanding that Israel sign
4 29
and comply with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
There is simply no justification for the U.S. having turned a blind eye toward
Israel's nuclear weapons program for years. 430 There is either one law for all or
no law at all. That leads us to our penultimate recommendation.
E. Consistently Support InternationalLaw and UN Resolutions
As we have seen, U.S. policy-makers have repeatedly and sanctimoniously
assailed Iraq for its defiance of previous UN resolutions and have cited it as a
justification for using military force to compel Iraqi compliance. 43 1 We have
been told repeatedly that Iraqi resistance to the resolutions, we have been told
repeatedly, threatens to render the UN "irrelevant." The U.S. government has
also periodically called for a war crimes
tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and
432
other members of the Iraqi leadership.
UN resolutions should indeed be enforced and those who violate them,
including Iraq, should not be immune from consequences. Yet the U.S. appears
tinconcerned, if not complicit, in the flaunting of the UN by a number of 433
its
allies, including Turkey, Morocco, Indonesia, and most prominently, Israel.
The latter nation has, for more than thirty-five years, stood in violation of
dozens of UN resolutions and has, by one count, been rescued from further
censure some twenty-seven times by U.S. veto. 434 A particularly poignant
example of the perceived U.S. double standard was manifested in the spring of
2002 when the U.S., after years of excoriating Iraq's non-cooperation with UN
inspections, idly observed Israel's defiance of a UN-mandated inspection of
4 35
possible war crimes in the Jenin refugee camp.
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The legitimacy of international law, as any law, turns on the universality of
its application. There cannot be one law for our "friends," or those whose
actions are perceived to suit our interests, and another law for our "enemies," or
those whose actions displease us. The sincerity and legitimacy for the U.S.
insistence that Iraq respect international law and institutions would be boosted
immeasurably by a consistent policy of meaningful support for UN resolutions
and firm resolve to ensure their enforcement in all cases. Even Iraq itself will
accept UN authority differently when it is applied consistently across the board
and can no longer be mistaken for a mere shell for the imposition of U.S.
foreign policy interests.
Similar considerations should govern our approach to the question of a war
crimes tribunal for the Iraqi leadership. Certainly there is ample evidence to
justify such an initiative and ending the sense of impunity enjoyed by many
436
governing elites should be a paramount goal of the international community.
U.S. credibility in leading such a venture, unfortunately, is diminished by our
437
government's refusal to ratify the statute of the International Criminal Court.
It is also undercut by our failure to promote similar initiatives with respect to
possible war crimes and other human rights violations by leaders of such allies
as Turkey and Israel. 438 A tribunal constituted in the aftermath of a war, victor's
justice, is also far less likely to meet wide acceptance and legitimacy than one
that does not. Thus, a war crimes tribunal for the Iraqi leadership should be
pursued. However, this must be a first, rather than last step, in a campaign to
end impunity within the Middle East and elsewhere for those who commit
egregious crimes against humanity. Our last policy alternative may be the most
important of all.
F. Aggressively Pursue a Just Resolution of the Israel/PalestineConflict.
Every policy move that we make with respect to the Arab and Muslim
worlds occurs in the shadow of our overwhelming support for Israel, and is
seemingly insensitivity to the needs, aspirations, and rights of the Palestinian
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people. 4 39 Nothing more inflames passions against us in the Middle East, or
elsewhere, than this support. 440 Thus, our credibility with respect to every other
issue confronted in the region, including Iraq, would be enhanced immeasurably
by both speaking and acting in such a manner as to demonstrate our
commitment to a just resolution of the conflict.
Thus far, we have commenced on the "speaking" part of this shift.
President Bush has taken the laudable first step in making support for a
"Palestinian state" an official objective of U.S. foreign policy.44 1 The
administration has also clearly recognized the link between Israel/Palestine and
Iraq and the necessity of attending to the former, in order to credibly address the
latter. That is why the administration has orchestrated meetings of the "Quartet"
(the U.S., Russia, the European Union, and the UN) and spoken of a new "road
442
map" to a peace agreement and Palestinian state.
There is much cynicism, however, regarding the sincerity of the U.S.
commitment to a resolution of the conflict that adequately accommodates
Palestinian rights and interests. The suspicion is that the Bush administration
commitment only may be to maintaining an appearance of progress toward a
peace agreement, and to a Palestinian "state" shorn not only of viable territory
but also of meaningful sovereignty. Such an eventuality will engender, not
deflect, anger against U.S. policies.
IV. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARD A JUST AND DEMOCRATIC U.S. POLICY INTHE
MIDDLE EAST
There is no reason that U.S. relations with Iraq, or with other countries of
the Middle East, must remain "frozen in antagonisms," to recall the phrase of
Zbigniew Brzezinski. Notwithstanding differences in religion, American and
Arab societies share some core values, including a strong veneration of equality
and a vigorous commitment to personal autonomy and individualism. 44 3 Even
societies that are very different can have fruitful relations based on mutual
respect.
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Needless to say, the kinds of policy changes proposed here require a
radical reorientation in our thinking about our policies toward Iraq and the
broader Middle East. We have long pursued policies of support for antidemocratic forces in the region, out of strategic and other realpolitik
considerations. Yet such figuring often has a self-reproducing quality - our
problem with Iraq started, in a sense, with our support for the coup reinstalling
the Shah of Iran in 1953. That, in turn, begat the 1979 Iranian revolution with
its strong anti-American overtones, thus creating the impetus to build up
Saddam Hussein. Now we reap the consequences of these policies in the
seemingly inevitable war, which is, in the end, the surest marker of our policy
failures. There will always be short- term risks attendant with a transition away
from this dangerous cycle. But pure self-interest demands that we begin this
reevaluation apace and seriously consider the merits of policies based on
justice, democracy, international legality, and a sympathetic consideration of
the rights, interests, and aspirations of the peoples of the Middle East.
U.S. actions toward Iraq for more than two and a half decades have
inflicted immense and unnecessary suffering on the Iraqi people and in a
number of respects, have violated international law. Now we stand at the
precipice of a dangerous descent into blatant unilateralism and illegality. This
descent is not inevitable, nor is it necessary, to vindicate legitimate U.S.
interests. We must decide whether international law is a deeply held value or
merely a quaint anachronism. Should we choose the latter, we will have no
moral refuge when we are next struck, still less when the tides of power shift
and the sword is one day at our throat. Having already suffered the flick of that
blade, we should aspire to better for ourselves and for our children.
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